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IRREVOCABILITY ®F BANK DRAFTS, CERTIFIED
CHEQUES AND MONEY ®R
Benjamin Geva*
Toronto
This article deals with three types ofnegotiable instruments payable on demand
which are issued, stamped or signed by banks prior to their collection and
payment, and used as mechanisms for the transmission offunds . These instru-
ments are the bank draft, including the bank money order, the certified cheque,
and the personal money order. The article is concerned with the binding effect,
or the irrevocability, of the bank's obligation on these instruments undèi; the law
ofbills and notes . It concludes that (1) the issuer of the bank draft is liable as a
drawer, and under some circumstances, also as a maker or acceptor, that (2)
cheque certification amounts to the acceptance of the cheque, and that (3)
imprinting the amount on a personal money order ought to be treated like cheque
certification . As to all three species, the bank's obligation is thus irrevocable .
Cet article traite de trois sortes de valeurs négociables payables d vue qui sont
émises, timbrées et signées par la banque avant d'être perçues et payées et qui
servent au transfert defonds . Il s'agit de la lettre de change bancaire, y compris
le mandatbancaire, du chèque certifié etdu mandatpersonnel . L'auteurs'intéresse
à laforce exécutoire, ou irrévocabilité, de l'obligation de la banque en vertu du
droit des lettres de change . Il en conclut (1) que l'émetteur de la lettre de change
bancaire est responsable en tant que tireur et dans certaines circonstances aussi
en tant qu'émetteur ou accepteur, (2) que la certification d'un chèque signifie
son acceptation et (3) que l'impression du montant sur un mandat personnel
devrait être équivalente à la certification d'un chèque . De toute façon, dans les
trois cas, l'obligation de la banque est irrévocable .
Introduction
The practice of paying a creditor with a negotiable instrument issued by. a
banker or another person of reputable credit' (hereafter : "banker's instru-
* Benjamin Geva, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, North York,
Ontario.
This article is part of a study on the allocation of risks in payment mechanisms
supported by a grant from the Foundation for Legal Research of the Canadian Bar
Association . For research assistance I am grateful to Ms . Stephanie Cheung of the 1956
graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School . Numerous bankers and lawyers from
various banks, trust companies and credit unions provided me with forms and generous
assistance as to pertinent banking practices . I am grateful for their invaluable input.
Needless to say, any error or misinterpretation is mine .
' Unless indicated otherwise, terms like "banker", "bank", "depositary financial
institution", or "financial institution", are used interchangeably . See also footnotes 9 and
11, infra .
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ment") is by no means a twentieth century innovation . In fact, an early
bill of exchange known to us was a banker's instrument used in payment
of debts arising in international commerce . Such an instrument was typi-
cally drawn by an exchanger on his correspondent in a foreign country . It
was payable to a creditor of the drawer's customer, and was sent by that
customer (who had remitted funds to the drawer) to his creditor in the
foreign country. Likewise, the forefather of the promissory note is the
goldsmith's note, given to a depositor of metallic money, and used by
him in payment of his debt .3
To this day, banker's instruments are used in payment of debts as a
substitute for cash . They are mechanisms for the transmission of funds
which facilitate the avoidance of the risk of physical carriage of money.
They further give the creditor the assurance of payment in the form of the
bank's credit attached to them.'
Inasmuch as they are bills, notes or cheques, banker's instruments
are governed by the Bills of Exchange Act,s or more generally, by the law
of negotiable instruments. (Hereafter, "Act" refers to the Bills of Exchange
Act, and a reference to a section is to a section of that Act, unless there is
an indication to the contrary). Nevertheless, notwithstanding their old
origin, banker's instruments are not dealt with by the Act as a separate
category . The Act governs three types of negotiable instruments: bills of
exchange (or bills), promissory notes (or notes),' and cheques.' A bank-
2 See in general, W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. VIII (2nd ed.,
1937 * rep. 1966), pp . 126-146.
s See in general, J.M . Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English
Law (1955), pp . 70-73.
4 Upon the insolvency ofa financial institution, first certified cheques drawn upon it,
and then its bank drafts and money orders (the two latter categories are lumped up as
"priority payment instruments") are accorded priority (subject to the right of secured
parties) under section 85 ofthe Canadian Payments Association Act, Part IV of the Banks
and Banking Law Revision Act, S .C . 1980-81-82-83, c. 40 . See discussion in Bradley
Crawford, The LawofBills and Notes, paper presented in Insight Program on The Law of
Bills and Notes (October 18, 1985, Toronto), Tab. VI, pp . 24-28 .
5 R.S.C . 1970, c. B-5 (as amended) .
6 For general comments recently made on the law of negotiable instruments, being
broader than the law of bills, notes and cheques, see, e.g.: D.V Cowen andL. Gering,
Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa (5th ed ., 1985), Vol. I,
General Principles, pp . 1-2, 153-155. Bills, notes and cheques "are the most common
examples of . . . negotiable instruments" ; ibid, p. 2.
7 A bill of exchange (or "bill" ; see s. 2) is defined in s . 17(1) as :
an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the
person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand or at
a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a
specified person, or to bearer.
8 A promissory note (or "note" ; see s. 2) is defined in s. 176(1) as :
an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another, signed by the
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er's instrument may fall into any of these categories . In general, it must
be issued, stamped or signed'° by a bank or another financial institution"
and used by its customer" in discharge of his debt or, indeed, by way of
gift . In practice, it is payable on demand" and collectible through the
clearing system . to When presented for payment by its holder,15 whether
over the counter or through the clearing system, its amount must have
been previously either prepaid or charged to the customer's account. A
domestic banker's instrument may be presented for payment .during a
period of ten years after the bank's credit has attached to it . 16 In Canada
the instrument is universally made payable to order and not bearer." .
maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, asum
certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer.
9 Under s . 165(1):
Acheque is a bill-of exchange drawn on a bank, payable on demand .
"Bank" is currently broadly defined in s . 164.1 to include, generally speaking, all
depositary institution members of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA). Besides
chartered banks, this includes trust companies and credit unions .
'° Thus, a bank draft is issued and signed by a banker, a certified cheque is stamped
and often signed but not originally issued by a banker, and a personal money order is
issued and stamped, but not signed by a banker. See discussion below. Inasmuch as a
banker's instrument is issued to the customer and not to the "holder", "issue" is not used
here in the technical sense of the definition in s . 2.
" Not necessarily a chartered bank . See footnotes 1 and 9, supra . In theory, except
for cheque certification, even CPAmembership is not a limiting factor. Creditworthiness,
or financial reputation and standing are the determining elements .
'2 The "customer" can be either a regular customer, having an account with the
bank, or an ad hoc customer, only for the purpose ofthe banker's instrument transaction.
's A bill payable on demand is defined in s. 23(1). In general, bills and notesmaybe
payable on demand . Cheques must be payable on demand; see footnotes 7-9, supra.
Provisions governing bills, generally speaking, apply to cheques and notes as well ; see ss .
165(2) and 186(1) respectively .
14 So as to constitute an effective machinery for the transmission offunds facilitating
the avoidance of the risk of carrying money in specie . Cf. Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v.
Burden (No . 2), [1972] 1 All E.R . 1210, at p. 1220c (Ch. D.) (as to element of
collectibility in the clearing system).
'5 Under s . 2, "holder" is "the payee or endorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it . . ." . Stated otherwise, the "holder" is not necessarily the customer's
creditor. It could also be his endorsee . "Holder" is further defined in s. .2 to encompass
the bearer of the instrument . But cf. footnote 17 and accompanying text, infra.
'6 See s. 209(1)(b) of the Bank Act, Part I of the Banks and Banking Law Revision
Act, S.C . 1980-81-82-83, c. 40 . Thereunder funds representing "a cheque, draft or
bill . . . payable in Canada in Canadian currency [which] has been issued, certified or
accepted by a bank at a branch of the bank in Canada", and has not been paid "for a
period of ten years" thereafter, shall be paid to the Bank of Canada . Such a payment
"discharges the bank from all liability in respect of the debt or instrument" ; ibid.
'7 Banker's instruments made out payable to bearer may be taken to violate the
prohibition to issue, reissue, make, draw or endorse "any bill, bond, note, cheque or
other instrument, intended to circulate as money, or to be used as a substitute for money"
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Neither the term "banker's instrument" nor any of its various cate-
gories has been authoritatively defined. The above definition as well as
the categories discussed in this article are based on prevailing banking
practices. Nevertheless, such practices are not entirely uniform. In the
absence of authoritative definitions, there is room for variations . As a
result some confusion is inevitable .
The scope of this article is limited to those instruments which are not
denominated in advance by the financial institution . It deals only with
those instruments made out in sums corresponding to the specific instruc
tions of the respective customer. Dueto space limitation, travellers' cheques
are thus excluded . 18
The article is designed to examine the irrevocability or the binding
effect of the banker's engagement on the banker's instrument under the
law of negotiable instruments . It does not purport to be a comprehensive
study of all aspects of the banker's instrument . For example, questions
relating to the autonomy or absolute nature of the banker's obligation,
that is to the bank's ability to set up defences to its irrevocable obligation,
are excluded from the scope of the article. Likewise, questions relating to
banker's instruments issued either without authority or by mistake, or
fraudulently misused, whether by theft, forgery of a signature, alteration,
or otherwise, are not to be discussed here . Also, the effect of paymentby
banker's instrument as a conditional or absolute payment of the custom-
er's obligation for which it is given is outside the present inquiry. The
scope of this article is limited to the irrevocability of the banker's obliga-
tion, or its binding effect towards the holder of the instrument .
Three premises underlined my investigation. First of all, the irrevo-
cability of the banker's obligation facilitates the acceptability of banker's
instruments as cash substitutes . Secondly, prevailing mercantile percep
tions as to irrevocability attached to any type of instrument should be
reflected in existing law. Thirdly, it is preferable to explain the irrevoca-
bility of the banker's obligation in the framework of the law of negotiable
instruments rather than under general principles of law. Indeed, fitting
irrevocability into a known category of statutory engagement under the
under s. 311(1) of the Bank Act, ibid . Prior to 1980, the prohibition was more explicit. S.
75(2)(a) of the old Bank Act (R.S.C . 1970, c. B-1) prohibited the issuance of "notes of
the bank payable to bearer on demand and intended for circulation" . For the different
Australian position, see footnote 32, infra.
In general, bills, notes and cheques maybe made payable to bearer. See definitions in
footnotes 7-9, supra. Bearer instrument is defined in s. 21(3). In theory, a banker's
instrument made payable to order, maybe subsequently converted to a bearer instrument
by the holder's endorsement in blank. See ss . 21(3) and 67 . In practice, such a conversion
is unusual as it defeats the security of the holder compared to that of a holder of cash.
1$ In general, for travellers' cheques see, e.g ., Cowenand Gering, op . cit., footnote
6, pp . 295-313; E.P. Ellinger, Travellers' Cheques and the Law (1969), 19 U.T.L.J . 132.
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Act is bound to produce a greater certainty than the application .of broad
and often open-ended general principles . -
1. Bank 'Drafts
The bank draft takes the form of an order to pay a sum of money,
addressed by a banker either to himself or to another banker. A bank draft
drawn on the drawer is usually drawn by a bank branch on its head office
or on another department or branch . .In general, bank drafts are signed by
two authorized officers of the bank. One of the two signatures is often
described on the instrument as "counter signature". . Where an instrument
is for a small sum, internal regulations may be satisfied with merely one
signature . Inasmuch as a bank draft is "signed" by the bank, 19 it embod-
ies a statutory engagement of the signing bank on the instrument .2° Bank
drafts may be purchased from the issuing bank in .any amount, subject to
no ceiling, and generally speaking, in any currency .
All particulars of a bank draft (that is date, amount payable, payee's
name) are typed on the instrument prior to its delivery to the _customer.
The customer, who as a purchaser of the draft either prepaid its amount in
cash or had his bank account charged with that sum, either gets a com-
'plete instrument, ready to be delivered to his creditor, the payee of the
instrument, on which he (the customer), does not have to sign at all; or,
alternatively, the instrument may be made payable to the customer who
will negotiate it to his creditor. Under the first alternative, as a purchaser
from the issuing bank of an instrument payable to his creditor, - the cus-
tomer is not a "holder" of the instrument.21 He is rather known as a
"remitter".22
Upon the sale of the bank draft to the customer, the amount payable
is placed in a special reserve account. Upon presentment for payment;
funds will be withdrawn or collected from that account. The instrument is
usually collected through the clearing system . . -
In practice, Canadian funds bank drafts issued : by the chartered
banks are invariably . drawn, on the drawer itself. The same applies to
'9 For the liability of a corporation on an instrument on the basis of one or more
authorized signatures on its behalf, and forthe exoneration from personal liability ofthose
who personally sign in a representative character, see ss . 4, 5, 51 and 52 .
z° Bills, notes and cheques must be "signed" ; see ss . 17(1), 176(1) and 165(1),
reproduced in footnotes 7, 8, and 9 respectively . For the nature and scope ofthe statutory
liability triggered by the bank's signature on a bank draft, see text and footnotes 51-87,
infra.
21 Being neither the payee nor endorsee . See definition of "holder" in s. 2. 'See also
footnote 15, supra.
22 See in general, EK. Beutel, Rights ofRemitters and Other Owners blot within the
Tenor of Negotiable Instruments (1928), 12 Minn . L. Rev. 584; J.E. Tobin, The Rights of
a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument (1967), 8 B.C . Indus. ~& Com. L. Rev. 260. . .
112
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol . 65
major trust companies .23The credit union movement in Ontario has recently
fallen into the same mould.24 Some trust companies draw Canadian funds
bank drafts on their respective correspondent chartered banks . Foreign
currency bank drafts are drawn, as a rule, by all types of Canadian
financial institutions, either on acorrespondent foreign bank, or on a for-
eign subsidiary or agency of a Canadian bank . 25
In the United States, bank drafts constitute only one class of what we
call bank drafts in Canada . Thus, in the United States, an instrument
drawn by a bank on itself is called either a cashier's cheque26 or a bank
money order.27 An instrument drawn by a savings bank or a savings and
loan association on a commercial bank is called a teller's cheque .28 A
bank draft in American terminology is an instrument drawn by one com-
mercial bank on another.29
Similar distinctions exist in England, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa . In England, a distinction is said to exist between abanker's
draft, drawn by one banker on another, and a banker's cheque, drawn by a
banker on himself." The distinction is nevertheless not universally pur-
sued in England, and "bank drafts" or "banker's draft" is frequently
used to cover both categories." In Australia, New Zealand and South
23 When issued by institutions other than chartered banks, the instrument is unlikely
to bear the title "bank draft" . Widespread alternatives are "official cheque", "corporate
cheque account", or "credit union draft" . Not infrequently, the instrument (even when
issued by a chartered bank) bears no "title . The legal nature of the instrument as "bank
draft" is not affected by any of the above.
24 The previous forms were drawings of each member credit union on the Ontario
central. This was modeled on the practice of branches of chartered banks which draw
domestic drafts on their head offices. Nevertheless, unlike a bank head office, a central is
a distinct legal entity. For business reasons, the standard forms were changed to omit
reference to the central, notwithstanding the fact that the account on which a credit union
draft is drawn is still with the central .
25 For such a bank draft, see, e.g ., Young v. Cashion (1909), 19 O.L.R . 491, at p.
494 (Ont. Div. Ct .) .
26 See, e.g ., Laurel Bank and Trust Co. v. The City National Bank ofConnecticut,
365 A. 2d 1222 (Conn., 1976); Missouri ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W. 2d
14, at p. 16 (Mo., 1976) .
n See, e.g ., Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First National Bank of York, 255 N.W. 2d
856, at p. 857 (Neb ., 1977): "A bank money order is essentially the same as a cashier's
check."
2$ See, e.g., Malphrus v. Home Savings Bank of City ofAlbany, 254N.YS. 2d 980
(Co. Ct ., 1965).
29 See, e.g ., Banco GanaderoyAgricola v. SocietyNational Bank ofCleveland, 418
E Supp . 520, at p. 523 (N.D . Ohio, 1976). A bank draft is "sometimes loosely referred to
as a cashier's check" .
30 For this distinction, see KarakRubber Co. Ltd. v. Burden (No. 2), supra, footnote
14, at p. 1220c.
31 See, e.g ., Cowenand Gering, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 220 andn. 156; Halsbury's
Laws of England (4th ed ., 1973), Vol. 3, para . 115 .
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Africa the distinction . between bank drafts and bank cheques is quite
firm.32 One Australian authority suggested that "banker's cheque" may
cover both the bank cheque andthe bank draft. In all these jurisdictions,
that is England, Australia, New Zealand and .South Africa, the bank
cheque is the more widely used instrument in domestic transactions .
Canadian banking practice recognizes the money order as a species
of the bank draft.34 The money order, unlike the ordinary bank draft,
bears one facscimile, signature of a high ranking officer of the issuing
bank . A handwritten signature on behalf of the bank must normally be
added upon the issuance of the money order.
Liability on a bill or note on the basis of a facsimile signature placed
on it requires further analysis . Chalmers defines "signature" as "the
writing of a person's name ôn a bill or note in order to authenticate and
give effect to some contract thereon" ." Falconbridge 36 adopts this defini-
tion, but nevertheless refers to the statutory definition of "writing" in
section 28 of the Interpretation Act.37 Thereunder, "writing" includes
printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form .
Falconbridge's conclusion is that, inasmuch as "writing" is not-necessar-
ily handwriting or subscription, a lithographed or stamped signature is
sufficient .38
owever, thé question is not free from doubt. Goodman v. .I . Eban
Ld.31 dealt with a statute requiring a solicitor to "sign" a document .
32 Cowen and Gering, ibid ., 'pp . 220 and 232 ., The Australian banking practice of
issuing bank cheques is referred to, e.g ., in Union Bank ofAustralia, Ltd . v. McClintock,
[192211 A.C . 240, at p . 245 (P.C .), and Australian Bank of Commerce, Ltd. v. Perel,
[1926] A.C . 737, at p . 740 (P C.) . The practice in Australia is, to issue such instruments
not only .i n favour of a named payee but also to bearer ; ibid . Compare text and footnote
17, supra .
33 Fabre v. Ley (1972), 46 A.L.J.R . 718, at p . 720 (Aust.11.C.), in connection with
a statute requiring payment "in legal tender or in a banker's- cheque" . It was specifically
held there that "personal cheque" was not a "banker's cheque" .
34 The "money order" is to be distinguished from the "personal money order"
discussed below in Part 111[. The "money order" corresponds to the U.S . "bank money
order" . See text and footnote 27, supra.
35 Chalmers on Bills of Exchange (13th ed., by D.A.L . Smout, 1964), p . 285 .
36 Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, (7th ed ., by A.W. Rogers, 1969),
pp. 440-441, 443 and 444 .
37 R.S .C . 1970, c . 1-23 . Section 28 defines writing as follows :
"writing", or any term of like import, includes words printed, typewritten, painted,
engraved, lithographed, photographed, or represented or reproduced by any, mode of
representing or reproducing words in visible form .
38 Falconbridge, op . cit., footnote 36, p. 444, n . (g)., citing Re London and Medi-
terranean Bank, Ex . Parte Birmingham Banking Co . (1868), L.R . 3 Ch . App . 651,, atpp .
653-654 .
39 [1954] 1 Q.B . 550 (C.A .) .
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Acknowledging inconsistency with "common sense and . . . ordinary
use oflanguage "'0 as well as with "[t]he first reaction of many people" ,4I
the majority of the Court of Appeal held that "where an Act of Parliament
requires that any particular document be `signed' by a person, then, prima
facie, the requirement of the Act is satisfied if the person himselfplaces
upon the document an engraved representation of his signature by means
of a rubber stamp" . 42 The general rule was said to be "that the essential
requirement of signing is the affixing in some way, whether by writing
with apenor pencil or by otherwise impressing upon the document, one's
name or `signature' so as personally to authenticate the document"."
Denning L.J . dissented . In his view, unlike a rubber stamp which
"can be affixed by anyone", a personal signature "carries on the face of
it a guarantee that the person who signs has given his personal attention to
the document" ; at the same time, being dependent "on the internal office
arrangements", the affixing of a rubber stamp "is contemptuously used
to denote the thoughtless impress of an automaton, in contrast to the
reasoned attention of a sensible person" ."
Perhaps a distinction ought to be made on the basis of the objective
of the signature requirement under the applicable statute. Where a signa-
ture is required to authenticate facts, "personal attention" maybe necessary.'
Nonetheless, wherea signature is required to authenticate liability, as it is
under the Act, "the thoughtless impress of an automaton" may suffice,
provided the person to be bound either authorized it, or is estopped from
denying the giving of authority.
However, in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley," Denning L.J . under-
stood the majority in Goodman as holding that "a private person can sign
a document by impressing a rubber stamp with his own facsimile signa
ture on it" . Nevertheless, he added, "it has not yet been held that a
company can sign by its printed name affixed with a rubber stamp" .'
Inasmuch as the Bills of Exchange Act specifically provides in sec-
tion 5 that an instrument duly sealed with the corporate seal satisfies
"signature" requirements, it is hard to see why a rubber stamp of a
corporation or its signing officer will not have the same function . The
question is always whether a given "signature" placed on an instrument
a° Ibid., at p . 555, per Evershed M.R.
a' Ibid ., at p . 563, per Romer L.J .
42 Ibid., at p . 557, per Evershed M.R . (emphasis added) ; cited with approval in Re
Botiuk and Collison (1979), 97 D.L.R . (3d) 356, at p. 360 (Ont. H.C .) .
43 Ibid ., at p . 557 . (Emphasis added) .
4 Ibid ., at p . 561 .
45 Cf. R . v . Siemens (1983), 9 W.C.B . 211 (Man . Prov. Ct.) .
°e [19561 1 Q.B . 702, at p . 710 (C.A .) . (Emphasis added) .
47 Ibid. (Emphasis added) .
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sufficiently manifests the party's intent to be liable thereon . A corpora-
tion resolving or representing that it is bound by documents bearing a
facsimile signature of its' officer ought to be seen as having "signed"
such documents. Indeed, under section 4, a signature may be "written"
on an instrument on behalf of a principal by an agent acting under the
principal's authority . Corporate authority must therefore link the agent's
signature, whether handwritten or impressed, to the corporation's liabil-
ity. In the, final -analysis, neither the separate entity of the corporation, nor
the nature of, and- statutory provisions applicable to, bills and notes
preclude the possibility of an authorized signature on a bill or note by way
of impressing a facsimile signature of a signing officer. Inasmuch as they
bear a facsimile signature of a bank officer. as required, money orders are
thus bank drafts "signed" by the bank . 48
Unless otherwise indicated, the ensuing discussion adopts the Cana-
dian classification and terminology. "Bank draft" is thus broadly used to
encompass the money order, and to cover drawings on the issuing bank
itself as well as on another bank . The basis for-the binding effect of the
drawer bank's engagement towards the holder` is now considered .
In general, a holder is a person who "may sue . . . in his own
name" parties liable on an"instrument (section 74(a)) . In connection with
an instrument payable to order, the "holder"~ is "the payee or endorsee"
in possession of it (section 2) . Outside the provisions of the Act, a payee
or any other holder may encounter difficulties in enforcing the engage-
ment of the issuing bank . Thus, in Dominion Express Co. v. Krigbaum49
an "express money order" which failed to -comply with the statutory
48 Cf. Bank of Canada v. Bank of Montreal (1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C .),
considering whether bearer 'notes' issued by Bank of Canada are "promissory notes"
governed by the Act. Such- an instrument was . "signed" by the Governor and Deputy
Governor of the Bank (ibid:, at p. 396) . Onecold safely assume that in fact it bore their
facsimile signatures . It was not even argued that consequently the note was not adequately,
"signed" . However, to the contrary see: Raymond v. Mervin (1925), 63 .C .S . 434, at p.
435 (Que . S.C .) .
Customer's liability on cheques on which a facsimile signature was affixed without
authority is discussed under the American U.C.C ., e.g ., in Perini Corp. v. FirstNational
Bank ofHabersham County, 533 F 2d 398 (5th Cir., 1977); First NationalBank & Trust
Co. v. Cutright, 205 N.W. 2d 542 (Neb ., 1973); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Phoenix Steel
Corp., 273 A. 2d 266 (Del ., 1971); and Wall v. Hamilton County Bank ofJasper, 276 So .
2d 182 (Fla . App., 1973). In general, corporate resolutions authorizing theuse offacsimile
signatures are given full effect .
For foreign jurisdictions where it was held that a stamped signature on a negotiable
instrument does not satisfy the statutory "signature" requirement, see Chalmers, op . cit.,
footnote 35, p. 285, n. 11 (with regard to Ceylon, now.Sri Lanka) ; and Byles on Bills of
Exchange (25th ed., by M. Megrah and FR. Ryder,. 1983), p. 12, n. 25 (with regard to
France).
49 (1909), 18 O.L.R . 533, at p. 539 (Ont . Div. Ct .) . As to the definition of "bill"
seesupra, footnote 7; and as to "remitter". see supra, footnote 22 and accompanying text:
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definition of "bill" was held to be "an agreement [ofthe express company]
with thé `remitter' to transmit and pay to the order of the payee of it the
sum mentioned in it" . The case nonetheless decided that the payee,
having no privity with the issuing express company, would not be entitled
to sue it upon the instrument . No such difficulty would have arisen had
the instrument been governed by the Adounder which aholder is given a
right of action . The liability towards him on the bank draft derives from
the signing party's statutory contract . The nature of the contract may vary
according to the form of the bank draft and the resulting classification of
the instrument under the provisions of the Act.
A bank draft drawn on another bank is a bill of exchange as well as a
cheques' The issuing bank is thus liable thereon to the holder" as a
drawer. As the drawer, the issuing bank "engages that on due present
ment [the instrument] shall be . . . paid according to its tenor, and that if
it is dishonoured [the bank] will compensate the holder . . . if the requi-
site proceedings on dishonour are duly taken" (section 130(a)) . Formali-
ties of presentment, and giving notice of dishonour, are thus required to
charge the drawer bank with liability .53
A bill which "is, or on the face of it purports to be" neither "both
drawn and payable within Canada", nor "drawn within Canada upon
some person resident therein", is a "foreign bill" .54 Foreign currency
bank drafts are normally drawn on a foreign entity and are payable out-
side Canada . s~ As such they fall into this category. Where a foreign bill is
dishonoured, it must be protested. Otherwise, the drawer bank is dis-
charged (section 112) . Protest is a solemn declaration ofthe dishonour of
the bill . It must be made by a notary . This formality supersedes notice of
so Quaere whether the difficulty could not be overcome, even in the absence of the
provisions of the Act, on the basis of viewing the delivery of the instrument by the
remitter to the payee as an assignment to the payee, by the remitter, of the debt owed to the
remitter by the express company.
" As defined in ss . 17(1) and 165(1) respectively, as quoted supra, footnotes 8 and
9. See Cowen and Gering, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 232, where it is said that such an
instrument "qualifies in all respects as a cheque"; see also p. 164.
52 See paragraph in text preceding that containing footnotes 49 and 50, supra.
53 Presentment for payment is required to charge the drawer and endorsers of a bill ;
see s. 85(2), and in general, ss . 85-95. Notice of dishonour must be given to the drawer
and each endorser; see s . 96(1), and, in general, ss . 96-126 . For possible excuses and
defences, see ss . 92, 107 and 166.
54 See s. 25 ofthe Act which reads as follows :
(1) An inland bill is a bill that is, or on the face of it purports to be,
(a) both drawn and payable within Canada ; or
(b) drawn within Canada upon some person resident therein .
(2) Any other bill is a foreign bill .
(3) Unless the contrary appears on the face of the bill, the holder may treat it as an
inland bill .
55 See text and footnote 25, supra.
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dishonour.16 Protest is governed, by sections 109 to 126. Nevertheless,
under section, 162, the holder's duties with respect to presentment for
payment, "and the necessity for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of
dishonour", are resolved "by the law of-the place where the act is done
or the bill is .dishonoured" . In connection with foreign bills, this law may
not be the Canadian Act. - .
The drawee bank of .a bank draft drawn by one bank on another,
whether it is an inland or foreign bill, incurs no liability to the holder.
Under section 131, no person is liable as a party on an instrument "who
has not signed it as such", and under section 127 "the drawee of a bill
who does not accept . . . is not liable on the instrument" . The drawee of
the bank draft not drawn on the drawer does not . normally accept or
otherwise sign the instrument .ss Accordingly, it is not liable thereon to the
holder.
A bank draft drawn by a bank on itself is in the form of a bill of
exchange or cheque .59 Such an instrument is governed by section 26,
which provides that "[w)here in a bill drawer and drawee are the same
person . . . the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as a
bill of, exchange or as a promissory note" . It has been held that an
instrument falling under section 26 is neither a bill nor a note .6o It is not a
bill or cheque, there being no separate drawer and drawee as required by
the statutory definition of "bill' ' Nor is it a "note" since it does not
contain a "promise" .6? Under this view, section 26 provides in effect that
56 See, in general, Falconbridge ; .op . cit ., footnote 36, p. 736 .
57, As defined in s . 25, reproduced. supra, footnote 54 .
5s Acceptance is governed by ss .: 35-38 . Generally speaking, itrequires the drawee's
signature ; . see ss . 35(1) and 36(2) . For the acceptor's liability under the Act, see paragraph
containing footnotes 79-82, infra .
59 See statutory definitions in footnotes 7 and 9, supra .
6° The position is summarized (with respect to the British corresponding provision)
in Re British Trade Corporation, Limited, [1932] 2 Ch . 1 (C.A .) .
61 London City and Midland Bank, Ltd . v. Gordon, [1903] A.C . 240, at p . 250
(H.L .) . See also Miller v. Thomson (1841), 3 Man & G. 576, 133 E.R . 1271 (C.P.);
Brown, Brough and Co. v. National Bank ofIndia (Limited). (1902), 18 T.L.R . 669, at p.
670 (K.B.D .), reluctantly following the Court of Appeal's decision in Gordon v. London,
City and Midland Bank, ttd ., [1902] 1 K.B . 242, as subsequently affirmed on that point
by the House of Lords .
S . 17(i) defines a bill of exchange partially as a written order "by one person to
another" . (See full definition in footnote 7, supra) . Such a requirement does not appear in .
the definition of "draft" ("bill of exchange") under s . 3-104 of the American U.C.C .
Thus, while the U.C.C . contains a provision corresponding to that of s . 26 in the Act
(U.C.C. s . 3-118(x)), there are no similar doubts thereunder as to the initial classification
of the bank draft drawn by a bank on itself as a bill .
62- Re British Trade Corporation, Limited, supra, footnote 60, explicitly distinguish-
ing the majority position in Miller v. Thomson, supra, footnote 61 . Pre-Act cases treated
an instrument in the form of a bill drawn by the drawer on himself as being "in the nature
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where there is a document in the form of a bill of exchange which is
neither a bill of exchange nor a promissory note, the holder may treat it
"as being what it is not",63 namely either a bill or note .' This does not
transform the nature of the instrument to either a bill or note, but merely
gives solely to the holder an option of treating the instrument either
way. 6a The difficulty with this widely accepted interpretation6' is that if
the instrument is neither a bill nor a note in the first place, its "payee or
endorsee . . . in possession of it" cannot be the "holder" as defined in
section 2 so as to be in a position even to exercise this option .66 Further-
more, section 26 itself calls the instrument a "bill" .' It is submitted that
the better view is to read section 26 to mean that a bank draft drawn by a
bank on itself, being in the form of a bill, is indeed a "bill",68 notwith-
standing the apparent requirement of a separate drawer and drawee in the
statutory definition of "bill of exchange" in section 17(1) . 69 Section 26
must further be read as premised on the assumption that an order of one
person to himself sounds as a promise of that person . This assumption
may be founded on the legal implication attached by the Act to the
drawer's order as an engagement to pay.'° Accordingly, the section goes
of a promissory-note" . Nevertheless, having drawn the instrument as a bill, the party
liable thereon was estopped from denying its classification as a bill of exchange . See
Willans v. Ayers (1877), 3 App. Cas. 133, at pp . 142-143 (PC.), followed inRe Commer-
cial Bank ofSouth Australia (1887), 36 Ch . D. 522, at p. 525 (Ch. D.) .
Under s. 176(1) of the Act, a promissory note (or "note" per s. 176(2)) is partly
defined as "an unconditional promise in writing" of its maker. For a full definition see
footnote 8, supra.
63 Re British Trade Corporation, Limited, ibid., at p. 14, per Romer L.J .
' To remedy some aspects of this anomaly it was enacted in the U.K . in 1932 that
the cross cheque sections shall apply to a bank draft drawn by the drawer on itself "as if
the draft were acheque"; see Falconbridge, op . cit., footnote 36, p. 876. See now the
Cheques Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz . 2, c. 36 . As crossed cheques are not widespread in
Canada (Falconbridge, ibid .), no corresponding amendment has been introduced here .
65 See, e.g ., Holden, op . cit., footnote 3, pp . 244, 276; Paget's Law ofBanking (9th
ed ., by M. Megrah andFR. Ryder, 1982), p. 216.
66 "Holder" is defined in s. 2 as "the payee or endorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it . . ." ; (emphasis added) . The option under s. 26 is given solely to the
"holder" .
67 See the text following footnote 59, supra.
6s As well as a cheque, as was in fact held (albeit without any discussion) inRoss v.
London County Westminster andParr's Bank, Ltd., [191911 K.B . 678, atp. 687 (K.B.D.) .
According to Paget, op . cit., footnote 65, p. 216, on the basis ofGordon, supra, footnote
61, this judgment must now be regarded as wrong.
69 Supra, footnote 60. This interpretation of s. 26 may be reinforced by s. 17(2)
which provides, in part, that an instrument that does not comply with the requirements of
s. 17(1) "is not, except as hereinafter provided, a bill of exchange"; (emphasis added) .
S. 26 maybe viewed as such an exception.
7° See s. 130(a), as quoted in the text, following footnote 52, supra. As applied to a
bill drawn on the drawer, the section provides in substance that the drawer engages to pay
upon his own failure (as the drawee) to pay the instrument .
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on to provide the holder with the option of treating such a"bill" at his
discretion as a note .
If a bank draft drawnon the drawer is a "MH7; there is no difficulty
in treating it as a cheque as well . This is so since the cheque is a species of
the bill of exchange." Indeed, the view that a bank draft drawn on the
drawer is not a cheque? is premised on the assumption that such an
instrument is not a bill,
Support for the interpretation of section 26 as either providing for, or
at least accommodating, the case of a true bill drawn on the drawer, may
be found in section 107. Thereunder; notice of dishonour is dispensed
with as regards the drawer of a bill where "(a) the-drawer and drawee are
the same person" . The provision thus explicitly contemplates a bill of
exchange drawn by the drawer on himself.
Where a bank draft drawn on the drawer is treated' as a promissory
note, the liability of the: issuing bank is that of a maker. Under section
185(a), the maker's engagement is that "he will pay [the note] according
to its tenor" . In general, neither presentment nor notice of dishonour is
required as regards the maker of a promissory note." Nevertheless, a
bank draft drawn on the drawer normally, bears an address of the issuing
bank. Inasmuch as the inclusion of this information may be viewed as
making the note "in the body of it" payable at a particular place," the
instrument is governed by section 183 .75 There is some controversy,
based on the ambiguous language of that provision, as to whether present-
ment for payment is required to render the maker liable where the note is
But see Re, British Trade Corporation, Ltd ., supra, footnote 60, at p . 11, where
GreerL.J . regarded a document drawn by a branch on its head office as "a request by the
branch . . . to the head office to undertake a liability . . ." .
~' See definition in s . 165(1), as reproduced in footnote 9, supra .
72 For. this view ; see,`é .g ., .hlalsbury, op . tit ., footnote 31 .
73 As to presentment, see s . 183(3); as to dishonour,'see s . 96(4), as applied to the
note by virtue, ôf s: 186(2) .
7' But see for the contrary view Re British Trade Corporation, Ltd ., supra, foot-
note 60 and cf. .footnote 82 and surrounding text, 'infra. '
7 5 S . 183 reads as follows : .
(1) where â promissory note is in the body of it made payable at a particular place, it
must De presemea for payment at that place .
(2) In such case the. maker is not discharged by the omission to present the note for
payment. . .but ifany . . . action is instituted thereon against him before presen-
tation, the costs thereof are in the discretion of the court . -
(3) where no place of payment is specified in the,body of the note, presentment for
payment is not necessary . . . to render the maker liable .
Case law dealing with whether a location indicated on the note is "in the body of it"
(though for the purposes of s . 184(2) dealing with presentment as regards an endorser) is
discussed byDavid J . Kee,lrlolders' Duties, paper presented in Insight's program on The
Law of Bills and Notes (October 18, 1985, Toronto), Tab . II, p . 25 . .
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made payable at a particular place. Thus, subsections (1) and (3) of
section 183 imply that presentment is required . On the other hand, sub-
section (2) seems to suggest that presentment is not required to charge the
maker, but in the absence of such a step the costs of an action against him
are "in the discretion of the court" . The prevailing view in Canada is that
no presentment is required to render the maker liable, even wherethe note
is payable at a particular place.
When the instrument is treated as a bill of exchange, the issuing
bank's liability is that of adrawer." Presentment is thus required to render
the drawer liable . At the same time, under section 107(a), notice of
dishonour is dispensed with as regards the drawer of a bill drawn on
himself.
Alternatively, a bill drawn on the drawer is often viewed in the
United States as "accepted by the mere act of its issuance" .7' An accep-
tor is a party primarily liable on the bill who "engages that he will pay it
according to the tenor of his acceptance" . Neither presentment nor the
giving of a notice of dishonour is required as regards the acceptor.'o
Section 93 explicitly provides that when a place of payment is specified
on the bill, the failure to present does not discharge the acceptor, though
costs of an action brought against him prior to presentment are at the
court's discretion . The ambiguity of section 18381 is not restated . In any
event, section 88 may suggest that the mere giving of an address on an
innstrument falls short of specifying a place of payment." This interpreta-
tion means that the mere inclusion of the bank's address on the bank draft
drawn on the drawer does not bring the instrument into the ambit of
section 93 . Irrespective of whether an accepted bank draft is covered by
section 93, it is nevertheless unequivocally clear that no presentment is
required to render the acceptor liable thereon.
76 See discussion in Kee, ibid ., pp . 21-23. The recent leading case is Liska v. Bank
ofBritish Columbia, [198114W.W.R . 223, at pp . 233-235 (Alta . Q.B .) . For the minority
view see, e.g., Zinck v. Dunlop (1956), 4 D.L.R . (2d) 58 (N.S .S .C .) . The U.K . corres
ponding section (s . 87(1)) explicitly requires presentment as regards the maker of such a
note ; see Kee, ibid ., at p. 22.
77 S. 130(a) . See text between footnotes 52 and 53, supra.
7s See paragraph which follows that containing footnote 72, supra.
79 Missouri ex rel . Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, supra, footnote 26, at p. 16 .
$° Presentment: under s. 85(2), only the drawer and endorsers are discharged upon
the failure to present a bill ; dishonour: s . 96(4).
$ 1 See text and footnotes 75 and 76, supra.
82 S. 88 reads in part as follows:
A bill is presented at the proper place
(a) where a place ofpayment is specified in the bill . . . ;
(b) where no place of payment is specified, but the address of the drawee or acceptor
is given in the bill . . .
This may mean that circumstances falling into clause (b) fall outside clause (a) which is
the case governed by s. 93 .
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In sum, irrespective of the classification of the instrument, no notice
of, dishonour ought to be given to the drawer of a bank draft drawn on
itself . Presentment ought to be made only ifthe instrument is treated as an
unaccepted bill . Nevertheless, the elimination of the presentment require-
ment under the other interpretations of the instrument, namely as regards
the maker of the note or the acceptor of the bill, is of a limited signifi-
cance . In theory, it may release the holder from the time restrictions," but
in practice not from the act of physical presentment . Indeed, in the
absence of such an act, "holder" status cannot be proved,84 nor can the
item be collected in the clearing system .85
The proper place of presentment is determined by section.88 . As it is
unusual forabank draft to specify ~ place of payment, presentment ought
to be made at the drawee's address as specified on the instrument." In the
absence of such address being specified, the instrument is to be presented
at the drawee's place of business, namely at any branch thereof."
In the United States, the issue of liability on a bank draft is often
*alt with as a question relating to the issuing bank's right to .stop pay-
ment on the instrument. The general rule is thus said to be that a bank
may not stop payment on a draft drawn on itself,$$ though it may stop
payment on a draft drawn on another bank.89. This seems to be an errone-
ous perspective,on the issue of a bank's liability on abank draft. Counter-
mand of payment is a matter between the drawer and the drawee" which
8' An instrument payable on demand, "is duly presented for payment" when it is
presented "within a reasonable time after its issue" ; see s. 86(1)(b) . Under s. 86(2), in
"determining what is a reasonable time . . . regard shall be had to the nature of the bill,
the usage of trade. . .and the facts of the particular case" . This is undoubtedly a broad
standard . Arguably, in connection with a banker's instrument, such a "reasonable time"
is the entire ten years after issue during which the instrument is collectible ; cf., footnote
16 and text, supra.
84 A holder must be in possession of the instrument ; see definition in s. 2, repro-
duced supra, footnote 15 .
85 The point was recently pursued to its utmost logic in Barclays Bank v. Bank of
England, [1985] 1 All E.R . 385 (arbitration), where it was held that a collecting bank
must physically present the cheque at the drawee branch and does not discharge its
statutory obligations under the Act by passing a cheque through the clearing system .
86 For relevant statutory language, see footnote 82, supra. Even when the draft is
drawn on the drawer, the address of the drawing branch may not be viewed as the
drawee's address. This indeed is a question of construing the language of the instrument .
$7 S. 88(c); and cf. footnote 95 and text, infra. ',
$$ See in general: S.R . Shapiro, Uniform Commercial Code: Bank's Right to Stop
Payment on Its Own Uncertified Check or MoneyOrder (1980), 97 A.L:R . (3d) 714.
89 See, e.g., Bank ofNew York v. Welz, 35 U.C.C . Rep. 1600 (N.YS.C . Sp . T.,
1983) .
9° S. 167 provides : "The duty and authorityof a bank to pay a cheque drawn onitby
its customer, are determined by (a) countermand of payment . . ." . U.C.C . s. 4-403 is to
a similar effect .
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does not discharge the drawer's liability on the instrument to the holder. A
drawee of a bank draft is obliged to comply with the drawer bank's
countermand and refuse payment to the holder. Nevertheless, the drawer
bank is not discharged thereby and remains subject to the holder's action
to enforce its statutory contract . 91
Inasmuch as they embody a banker's statutory contract under the
Act, bank drafts are looked upon as substitutes for cash . 92 Nevertheless,
this does not necessarily mean that they can always be converted to cash
immediately upon deposit at any holder's bank . A collecting bank may
not be certain that such instruments bear genuine and authorized signa-
tures on behalf of the issuing bank,93 and may not therefore allow the
depositor funds upon the deposit of a bank draft until actual collection .
Such a scenario is more likely to happen as the amount of the draft, the
geographical distance between the points of issue and deposit, or both,
increase . Needless to say, the creditworthiness of the banker liable on the
instrument may also play a role in determining the acceptability of its
instruments as substitutes for cash." But in general, within Canada, bank
drafts issued by Canadian banks may be converted to cash immediately
upon presentment or deposit. This is particularly true in connection with
bank drafts drawn on the drawer. Those can be turned to immediate funds
at any of the drawer's branches, subject only to proper identification of
the holder where he is not a customer of the branch or bank . 96
9' Whether the drawer bank maydefend the holder's action on the basis of either the
drawer bank's defences against the remitter, or the remitter's defences against the payee,
is an entirely different question and outside the scope of the present article .
92 Payment by bank draft avoids the need to carry cash in specie . On its part, a bank
giving a customer a secured purchase money loan, may prefer to give the proceeds ofthe
loan in the form of a bank draft payable to the seller, so as to ensure use of the loan
proceeds for the designated purchase, as well as a "purchase money security interest"
under s. 1(s)(ii) of the Ontario Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O . 1980, c. 375 as
am., or similar provincial legislation elsewhere.
93 Various devices exist fordiscovering counterfeit bank notes (namelypaper money) .
No correspondingdevices existfor the discovery offorged or unauthorized signatures on a
bank draft. Liability of a bank for an unauthorized signature on its bank draft form is
outside the scope of this article .
94 For the insolvency risk see footnote 4, supra. Generally speaking, the statutory
priority is not equal to payment on demand .
95 One bank addresses its order on the standard bank draft form to "any branch" of
that bank . This does not seem to violate s. 20 which requires that the drawee be named or
indicated in the bill "with reasonable certainty" . In general, this seems to be a marketing
device designed to emphasize the convertibility of the draft to immediate funds at any
branch of that bank. Where the drawee's address is specified on the instrument, and the
draft is cashed at a branch with another address, technically speaking, the instrument is
not "paid" at that point (cf. text around footnotes 86 and 87, supra) but is rather
"purchased" or deposited for collection (though against immediate credit available for
withdrawal) .
96 Some financial institutions will not even cash bank drafts drawn on themselves
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11 . Certified Cheques
"Certification" is the name given to the marking of a cheque by the
drawee bank to show that it is drawn by the person purporting to draw it,
that it is drawn upon an existing account with the drawee, and that there
are funds sufficient to meet it . Certification is demonstrated by some
physical marling on the cheque, .normally stamping on its face the word
"certified'! ."
Certification may be procured by a drawer who .either wishes, or is
required by his creditor, to add the credit of the drawee bank to his own
engagement . Certification may also be procured by the holder, who prior
to the collection of the proceeds of the cheque through, the clearing
system, wishes to secure payment.98
Whether procured by the drawer or the holder, certification includes
the withdrawal of the amount of the cheque by the drawee bank from the
customer-drawer's account. This amount is then set aside into a special
suspense (or "outstanding items") account. The drawer's encoded account
number must be obliterated from the instrument so that the cheque will
not be routed again to his ownbank account"Instead, a sticker,, ndicating
the new suspense account number to which the item is to be charged, is
affixed on the instrument .99 The cheque is collected and charged to that
suspense accounton ihe,sùbsequent presentment for payment of the certi-
fied. cheque by its holder. Such representment is likely to be made through
the clearing system . In .practice, only completed cheques are certified in
Canada . goo
over the counter to non-customers. Quaere whether this does not amountto dishonour of
the bank draft.
97 For Canadian perspectives on certification, see, e.g ., P Thomas, The Status of
Certified Cheques (1973), 80 The Canadian Banker 6:20; Crawford, op . cit., footnote4,
pp . 1-9; M.H . Ogilvie, Banking-The Law in-Canada (1985), pp . 315-318 .
98 Canadian banks are reluctant to pay cheques over the counter to holders who are
not their own customers. The reason is the absence of effective recourse in the case of a
holder lacking title to the instrument . Practically speaking, a holder who is anxious to
obtain prompt payment may be required to have the cheque certified instead . Quaere
whether the drawee's refusal,to pay over,the counter may not amount to the dishonour of
the cheque (s . 95) so as to entitle the holder to sue the drawer and prior endorsers (but not
the drawee bank itself) . See text and footnote 101, infra. Since certification is a reason-
able solution from the holder's as well as the drawee bank's respective viewpoints, the
question will rarely arise.
99 Such stickers often peel off in the automated sorting machines . Where it happens,
the cheque is routed to the drawer's account. In anticipation of such a risk, the drawee
bank may punch a hole in the drawer's account number encoded on the cheque. The
whole process maythus be cumbersome in the context of electronic banking. American
banks are phasing out certified cheques. Bank drafts payable to the payee (or holder)
will be issued directly by the drawee :bank upon presentment and debiting. the account of
the drawer of the cheque .
too For a pompletely different certification practice in South Africa, see Cowenand
-Gering, op . cit., footnote 6, pp . 213-219. Under that practice, a blank cheque_is certified
at the drawer's request by setting on its back an upper limit as to amount .
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A certified cheque is thus originally drawn on the customer's regular
chequing account. It is completed by the drawer (drawee bank's cus-
tomer) himself prior to its certification . The practice ought to be under
stood in light of the general rule under which a drawee of a cheque is not
liable thereon. T' Conversely, the mercantile expectation is that a certified
cheque ought to be honoured by the drawee bank, irrespective of either
the drawer's state of account or, notwithstanding section 167, termination
of the drawer's authority to pay by virtue of the drawer's countermand of
payment or death.
The current practice of cheque certification originated in North
America. I°2 Indeed, old English authorities recognized a practice existing
among bankers of marking cheques presented by a collecting bank after
four o'clock p.m. The marking was designed to bind the drawee bank in
the next day clearing ." The practice was howeverdiscontinued, I°4 and is
not regarded as forming the foundations of certification . lo5
Neither the practice of cheque certification nor its effect is provided
for explicitly by the Act. There is no provision corresponding to section
3-411 of the American UniformCommercial Code, under which "[c]erti
fication of a check is acceptance" . Furthermore, the orthodox position
expressed by Falconbridge is that in the case of a cheque, "the drawer
does not engage that it will be accepted and paid, but that it will be paid,
the holder's right being to presentment for payment only" . I°6 Indeed,
referring to the-:early practice of marking, Lord Mansfield expressed his
view that its effect "is similar to the accepting of a bill" . 107 This view
was nevertheless specifically rejected by the Privy Council in Bank of
Baroda, Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, Ltd.' °$ Lord Wright explicitly
held that certification did not amount to an acceptance, observing that
"[i]t would certainly require strong and unmistakeable words to amount
1°1 See s. 127 (providing that by itself a bill is not an assignment offunds and that a
drawee who does not accept is not liable on the instrument), and s . 131 (providing that a
signature is required to fasten liability on an instrument) .
1°2 See in general W.H . Bryant, Certification of Bank Checks (1888), 36 (O.S .)
American Law Register 141 ; W.F. Elliott, Certified Checks (1889), 31 Central L.J . 373;
ER . Jones, The Liability of the Maker of aCheck After Certification (1892), 6Harv. L.
Rev. 138; L.J . Tompkins, The Certification of Checks (1902), 50 (O .S .) American Law
Register 127.
103 The leading authority is Robson v. Bennett (1810), 2 Taunt 388, 127 E.R. 1128
(C.R). See also Goodwin v. Robarts (1875), L.R . 10 Ex . 337, at pp . 351-352.
'0' See text at footnote 135, infra.
ios See the comprehensive account of Tompkins, loc. cit., footnote 102, at pp .
128-131 .
1°6 J.D. Falconbridge, The Law ofNegotiable Instruments in Canada (1967),.p . 67 .
i°7 Robson v. Bennett, supra, footnote 103, at pp . 396 (Taunt), 1131 (E.R .) .
108 [19441 A.C . 176 (RC.) .
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to the acceptance of a cheque".'109 All this appears :to .suggest that in
Anglo-Canadian law cheque certification' is not an acceptance .
It is nonetheless universally agreed in Canada that certification is a
binding obligation of the drawee bank enforceable by the holder. "0 Indeed,
the appropriation of funds designed-to meet the cheque ; which forms part
of the practice of certification, supports such a treatment: There is, how-
ever, less uniformity and clarity as to the juridical nature, or as to the
underlying theory, of the drawee bank's engagement. on the certification.
Gaden v. Newfoundland Savings Bank, 111 dealt with a cheque certi-
fied before its delivery to the payee as its , first holder, that is where
certification was procured by the drawer. The case stands for the proposi
tion that the effect of certification is "to, give the cheque additional
currency by shewing on the face that it is drawn in good faith on funds
sufficient to meet its payment, and by adding to the credit of the drawer
that of the bank on which it is drawn" . This tends to suggest that the
drawee bank is liable to the holder after certification, but fails altogether
to explain why. !. 12 InBoyd-v. litasniith l '3 certification wasprocured by the
holder. In hisjudgment, MacMahon J. relied heavily on Americanauthori=
ties which treated the certification -of a` cheque as an equivalent to an
acceptance . 114 1-Ie nonetheless did not-state whether this line of American
cases had formed the basis of his conclusion as to .the bank's liability. At
trial, Street J . was quite explicit in regarding the bank's liability on the
certification as based on an -agreement with the holder. This agreement is
a "promise to pay. [given by] the bankerswhich the [holder] had,procured
to be substituted;for [the drawer's original Contract]" .I:IS Where the payee
took the uncertified cheque from the drawer, Street J. explained the
position as follows:Ils . . . . . . .
I°9 Ibid ., at p. 188.
See, e.g ., Ogilvie, op . cit., footnote 97, P. 315 and n. 51, relying on The
Manitoba Mortgage Company v. The Bank ofMontreal (1890).,.17 S.C.R . .692 ; Union
Bank of Canada v.'Nettleton (1924), 55 O.L.R . 643'(Ont . H.C .) . Nevertheless, both
cases are notexplicit in referring to certification . They rather speak of the drawee's direct
liability upon the "acceptance" of a cheque : at pp . 695-696 (S.C.R .), and at p. 645
(O.L.R .) . For amod6m authority truly supporting Ogilvie's statement, see Commercial
Automation Ltd. v.`Banque Provincialedu Canada (1962), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 316, at p. 321
(Que. S.C.) . For the same view, that certification . in North America "adds a new party,
the bank, as primary debtor", see also Bank ofBaroda, supra, footnote 108, at p. .187 .
Y1Y. ; [18991 A.C.,281, at pp . 285-286 (PC.) .
112 The concluding .words:ofthe quoted passage were subsequently characterized by
Lord Wright as being "not very precise" ; Bank ofBaroda, supra, footnote 108, atp. 187.
(13 (1889), 17 O.R. 40 (Ont . C.PI3 .) .
114 Ibid ., at .pp . 46-49. Quebec authorities are cited in Commercial Automation,
supra; footnote 110.
its Ibid., at p. 41 .
116 Ibid.
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It was the duty ofthe payee to present it for payment . . . . The duty ofthe bankers,
as between themselves and the drawer, was to pay the amount of the cheque upon
presentation, because they had in their hands funds to meet it . The payee had no
right, as between himself and the drawer, to present the cheque for any other
purpose than payment . . . but he chose to . . . take the bankers' undertaking to
pay upon a further presentation . By doing so he has discharged the drawer . . .
In the United States, such a separate and substituting agreement
between the drawee bank and the holder was viewed either as a novation,
or a new instrument, possibly a certificate of deposit payable on demand
or a promissory note, issued by the drawee bank to the holder."' The
separate and substituting agreement was premised on treating the cheque
itself as being discharged"' upon the debiting of the drawer's account in
the process of certification . The certified instrument could thus not be
regarded as the original cheque . Hence it constituted the source of a new
species of engagement .
It is submitted that, as an engagement on the instrument, certifica-
tion is better viewed as deriving from the acceptor's contract and not as
premised on a "substituting agreement" outside the cheque . To begin
with, as a matter of its form, a certified cheque remains a "bill of
exchange drawn on a bank, payable on demand" so as to constitute a
"cheque" within the meaning of section 165(1) . The doubts whether a
certified cheque is a "cheque" are thus unfounded from aformal point of
view."' Secondly, the historical controversy as to whether a cheque is a
species of "bill" so as to be capable of "acceptance" 120 is conclusively
resolved by the definition of "cheque" in section 165(1) expressly defin-
ing a cheque as a form of a bill . Furthermore, section 165(2) explicitly
provides that, unless otherwise provided in Part III, "the provisions of
this Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
cheque" . Hence, from a formal standpoint, there is no valid objection to
the acceptance of a cheque . Indeed, while being hostile to the whole idea
of an acceptance of a cheque as well as to cheque certification, the Privy
Council in Bank ofBaroda 121 found itself unable to "categorically . . .
hold that a cheque can never be accepted" . While being of the opinion
"7 By way of example see (1) novation: Bryant, toe. cit ., footnote 102, atp. 148; (2)
new instrument: Tompkins, loc. cit., footnote 102, at p. 134; (3) certificate of deposit:
Bryant, ibid ., at p. 151 ; (4) promissory note: Jones, loc. cit., footnote 102, at p. 143. For
the alternative acceptance theory see Elliott, loc. cit., footnote 102, at p. 374.
"s But see paragraphs containing footnotes 142-149, infra .
"9 It does not follow that the duty and authority of a bank to pay a certified cheque
drawn on it by its customer are determined by countermand of payment or notice of death
under s. 167. As a matter of statutory interpretation, s. 167 should be held as inapplicable
to certified cheques.
'2° As to this controversy, see, e.g., Jones, loc. cit., footnote 102, at pp. 138-142,
and Tompkins, loc. cit., footnote 102, at pp. 131-132.
'2' Supra, footnote 108, at p. 187. (Emphasis added) .
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that "it is only done in very unusual and special circumstances" ; ford
Wright fully acknowledged the legal pbssibility: 122
According to Bradley Crawford, neither usage nbr case law requires
certification to be signed . 123 Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is universally
agreed in Canada that certification is abinding engagement of the drawee
bank, 124 the marks or stamps forming the certification should be viewed
as adopted by the bank as its own "signature` . 125 Signature is required
for liability on an, instrument in general (section 131), and for the accep-
tor's liability in particular (section 36(1)(a)).126 The drawee's liability on
a bill is linked to acceptance (section 12).12' The certifying bank's pay-
ment obligation is consistent with the acceptor's statutory contract under
section 128 . 128 Certification ought to be treated ass signature -by the bank
so as to establish its statutory liability as an acceptor.129 Finally, the
prevailing view is that."any words which indicate that the -drawee means
to pay is a sufficient acceptance".'s° lords, and symbols recognized as
certification meet .this standard, 11i For-all these reasons, certification by
the draweebank appears to constitute an acceptance.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that existing Anglo-Canadian author-
ities fall short of recognizing the -sufficiency of "signing" by impressing
122 Ibid . For an explicit statutory reference to "the non-acceptance or non-payment
of a cheque" see s . 6(3) . See also Keene v. Beard (1860), 8 C.B . (INS .) 372, 141 E.g .
1210 (C.P.) . In his judgment, Erle C.J. stated, at pp : 380 (C.B .), 1213 (E.R .) : "A cheque
is strongly analogous to a bill of exchange in'many respects . It is drawn upon a banker ;
and, though in practice the banker does not accept the draft ; he mightfor ought I know .do
so . ,>
123
®p . cit . ; footnote 4,. p . 3 . ,
124 See text and footnote 110, supra .
,125 NotwithstandingMeteorEquipmentRentalsLtd .v.,MacMillan(1970),75W.W.R .
660 (B .C . Co . Ct .), and authorities cited there .
126 Under s "1-4o person is liable as drawer endorser or acceptor of a bill who. 131, ;
has not signed it as such . . ." ; under s . 36(1)(a) an acceptance "must . . . be signed by
the drawee" .
127 S . 127 provides : '
A bill, ofitself, does not operate as an assignmentoffunds in the hands ofthe drawee
available for the payment thereof, and' the drawee of a bill who does not accept. as
required by this Act _ig not liable o11 the instrument: .
128 S. 128 provides :
The acceptor' of a bill, by accepting it, engages that he will pay it according to the
tenor of his-acceptance .
129. See'preceding paragraph . The'only other-type ofliability on an instrument which
may be considered, at least in theory, is that of the anomalous endorserunder the conclud-
ing clause of s . 131 : " . . . when a person signs n bill otherwise than as a drawer or
acceptor he thereby incurs the liabilities of,an endorser . . . ." It is nevertheless more
plausible to treat the drawee's signature as an acceptance .
130 Falconbridge, op : cit . ;'footnote 36, p . 514 :
131 This is so inasmuch as they express the drawee bank's undertaking ; see- text at
footnote 125, supra .
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a stamp which is not a facsimile of the person's signature . 132 The doubts
seem to be unfounded . The controlling general test is that of an intention
to authenticate a writing . 133 In connection with practices employed in
cheque certification, where no handwritten signature is required to bind
the bank, the impressing of the certification stamp is thus adequate . 134
There is a threefold explanation to the doctrinal hostility to the view
that certification amounts to an acceptance . The first explanation is the
unfamiliarity of English judges with certification . Summarizing the English
position, the editors of the current edition of Byles observed that "bank-
ers only rarely allowed customers to have their cheques marked", and
that "[n]o usage in favour of the holder of a marked cheque had ever been
established in [England]" . They categorically concluded that "[t]oday,
no cheque may be marked for any purpose" . 13s Needless to say, this is not
the case in Canada.
The second explanation is the failure of the Privy Council in Bank of
Baroda to appreciate the function of certification as generating a banker's
liability . According to Lord Wright : 136
As between the drawer and his bank, acceptance of a cheque is superfluous . It
would be merely a confirmation of the contractual liability of the bank to honour the
customer's orders to pay.
This however overlooks the fact that substantial benefits accrue to the
holder who obtains a right to recover from the drawee, a right which the
holder does not have except for certification or acceptance . 137 This right
enables the holder to view the certified cheque as a reliable machinery for
funds transfer which avoids the need either to obtain a prompt payment of
the cheque over the counter or to insist on a cash payment in the first
place.
132 The divergent views are summarized in Re Botiuk and Collison, supra, footnote
42, at p. 360.
133 See text and footnote 43, supra. TheU.C.C . position is fundamentally the same;
see sections 1-201(39) and 3-401(2) .
134 Forthe relevance of bank practices in viewing certification as an acceptance, see,
e.g ., A. Perrault, Traité de Droit Commercial (1940), Vol. III, p. 1036 . But Perrault may
be understood as insisting on a "signature" added to "certification" ; ibid., p. 1037 .
Cf. Menke v. Board ofEducation, 13 U.C.C . Rep. 675 (Iowa S .C ., 1973), where the
certification stamp contained a signature line . When no signature was placed on the
stamped cheque, the court held that the cheque was not accepted.
135 Byles, op . cit., footnote 48, p. 288 . See also Paget, op . cit., footnote 65, p. 248,
quoting a 1920 resolution of the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, providing
"[t]hat the practice of marking or certifying at the request of a customer his cheques or
drafts upon a clearing bank be discontinued . . ." .
136 Supra, footnote 108, at pp . 184-185.
137 See s. 127, reproduced, supra, footnote 127. This point was subsequently acknowl-
edged by Lord Wright in Bank of Baroda, supra, footnote 108, at p. 187. See supra,
footnote 110.
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Thirdly, there is some confusion as to the impact of the funds appro-
priation by the drawee bank which is an integral part' of the certification
machinery.- Perhaps this element convinced Lord Wright to conclude ,in
ink ofBaroda t3g that in the United States as well as in Canada "certifi-
cation is different both in its history and its effects from acceptance", and
at the most it can be regarded as an "equivalent" to an acceptance ; but
nut.as d mode of acceptance . It seems to me that this observation is quite
misguided. It fails to appreciate the rationale for the segregation of funds,
as well as to take into account additional facets of cheque certification . In
fact, funds segregation is consistent with the acceptance of the cheque .
Nor does it modify, the nature of the banker's engagement . Indeed, Lord
Wright himself acknowledged in Bank ofBaroda' 39 that" 1f the bank . . .
accepts the cheque,, it should be entitled to protect itself . . . by setting
aside the appropriate funds standing -to the customer's credit". Funds
appropriation is thus a step taken by the drawee bank to protect itselffrom
the consequences of its ownengagement on the instrument . Indeed, where
the cheque is postdated, the drawee bank is not authorized to debit the
drawer's account. prior to the -date . of the cheque . Hence; a post-dated
cheque cannot be certified. '40 The drawee bank may nevertheless decide
to accept such a cheque . This practice' is- unusual, though theoretically
quite possible . But whether the drawee bank . merely accepts a cheque, or,
in the case of a current cheque, certifies it, the legal nature of its liability
on the instrument is quite the same . Debiting the drawer's account may
create an added dimension to certification.',' It nevertheless falls short of
affecting the nature of . the drawee bank's undertaking. Certification is
thus an acceptance plus something else . Nonetheless, itis still i nn -acceptance .
In light of the preceding analysis, the "substituting contract"142
theory should be rejected . To begin with, it can hardly accommodate the
case where certification- is procured by the drawer. In addition, it is
founded on false.premises . It is based either on an outdated view as to_the
legal nature of "cheque", or on a misconception as to what constitutes a
138 Supra, footnote 108, at p. 187. In so holding;Lord Wright was assisted by the
language of s. 187 of the American Uniform Negotiable Instruments Acts (known as
N.I .L .), under which."the certification is equivalent to an acceptance" ; ibid ., at p. 186. It
is noteworthy that the successor of this provision, U.C.C . . s. . 3-411 ; eliminated the ambi-
guity by providing that "[c]ertification of a check is acceptance" ; see paragraph contain-
ing footnote 106, supra. Emphasis (in.both statutory provisions) is added.
139 Supra, footnote 108, at p. 185';
14° See, e.g ., Keyes v. RoyalSank ofCanada, [1947] S.C.R . 377; Canadian Impe-
rial Bank of Commerce v.-Perrault, [1969] Que. Q.B . 958 (Que . C.A:) . while the
cheques dealt with in Bank of Baroda were postdated, Lord Wright's analysis was not
limited at all to this situation .
141 See footnote 147 and text, infra.
142 See text at footnotes 115-119, supra.
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discharge of a cheque . 143 Indeed, a cheque is discharged by payment in
due course by the drawee to the holder (section 139) . I44 Prior to collection
by the holder, though subsequent to the appropriation of funds and debit-
ing the drawer's account, no payment has been made. This is so since
neither cash nor absolute control over the segregated funds, except through
the representment of the same instrument, is transferred to the holder. I4s
He does not earn interest on the money, 146 and may further negotiate the
instrument itself, and thereby transfer his right to the funds, to a subse-
quent holder. True, it is possible to view the segregation of funds specific-
ally earmarked to meet the instrument as an act discharging the drawer. "'
Nevertheless, it does not follow that the instrument itself has been
discharged . 148 It is extremely artificial and unnecessary to view the draw-
ee's undertaking as terminating the life of the cheque and creating some-
thing new of unknown quality, rather than as merely adding, or even
substituting, liability on the cheque . Funds segregation is designed to
protect the drawee . It should not be taken to affect the juridical nature of
its engagement on the instrument. In the final analysis, the view that this
engagement is an acceptance l49 is consistent with the provisions of the
Act as well as with the mercantile understanding of certification .
III . Personal Money Orders
A personal money order' s' is an instrument sold by the bank over the
counter for its face value plus a small fee.'"' The face value is in a sum
143 See text at footnotes 120-123, supra; and at footnotes 99-100, supra.
144 For the discharge of an instrument, and that of a party, see footnote 148, infra.
145 Whether the drawer is discharged upon the certification of the cheque, is an
entirely different question, merely referred to in footnote 147, infra.
146 Cf. Crawford, op . cit., footnote 4, p. 8, citing Wilson v. Banque Ville Marie
(1880), 3L.N. 71 (Que . S.C .) (a drawer who procured the certification ofa cheque which
has not been presented to the drawee by the payee or any other holder, is entitled to the
funds, but not to interest thereon) .
147 This is the rule where certification was procured by the holder. For this point see
the detailed discussion in Crawford, ibid ., pp . 4-8. The drawer is not discharged if
certification was procured by himself. The same distinction also exists under U.C.C . s.
3-411(1) . The distinction, or more specifically the rule that a drawer procuring certifica-
tion is not discharged, is criticized by both Jones and Tompkins, in their respective
articles, loc. cit., footnote 102. By now, the point is nevertheless quite settled . Adetailed
discussion as to the drawer's liability is outside the scope of this article .
I4a For the distinction between a discharge of a bill, and that of aparty thereto, see
Falconbridge, op . cit., footnote 106, p. 150 (commentary to s. 139) . In general, "[a]n
instrument is discharged by payment in due course by the party primarily liable to pay,
that is, by the drawee or acceptor ofa bill . . ." . Conversely, "payment by the drawer or
by an endorser does not discharge the instrument . . ." ; ibid .
149 For the statutory contract of the acceptor, see Part I, paragraph containing foot-
notes 79-82, supra.
ISO In the U.S ., the instrument is often called "register check" ; see, e.g., Garden
Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. First National City Bank, 3 U.C.C . Rep. 355, at p. 356
(N.Y S.C . App. Div., 1966).
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specified by the purchaser; up to a certain ceiling . 'Upon the conclusion of
the purchase of the instrument and prior to its delivery by -the bank to the
purchaser, the bank imprints, the sum on the instrument with its imprinting
machine . Except for the ruin, the_histrument is sold by the bank in a blank
form . Its purchaser (often designated thereon either as "sender" or "renut-
ter") fills in all other particulars, namely, date, his ownnaïve and address, .
and apayee of his choice : The instrument is completed by the sender at
his owndiscretion, not necessarily on the bank's premises, andnot as"part
of the purchase process. ' .
Further common characteristics ofthe typical personal moneyorder"',
are that it contains a signatureline for the sender; and that the name of the
issuing bank is printed on it in bold letters. The sender ought to sign the
instrument prior to its delivery to the payee. No signature of an authorized
officer, or any other signature on behalf of the bank, 'appears on the
instrument . Except for the imprinted amount, the instrumentis very much
in the form of a personal cheque : .
Upon the sale of the personal moneyorder to the remitter, its amount,
whether paid in cash or debited to the remitter's bank account, is depos-
ited to the credit.of a special reserve account of the issuing branch . In this
respect, the practice used in connection with the personal money order is
quite similar to that associated with the issuance of bank drafts as well as
cheque certification. 153
In some respects, the personal money. order resembles the bank
draft . Both are sold . by the issuing bank over the- counter in an. amount
specified on the instrument (whether typed, in the base of the bank draft,
or .imprinted, in the case of the.personal money order) ., Nevertheless,. the
bank draft is issued in a complete form .and is signed - by, authorized
officers of the issuing bank . 154 ®n the other .hand, the. personal money
order is sold in a blank form .(except for the amount) and .is-not signed by
an authorized officer. The bank record copy discloses no . information
about the. sender or payee. is5 ;Having bought the personàl money order,
the sender has full discretion as to filling in the payee's name. He may
151 Certain types of bank accounts may entitle their holders,to obtain such instru-
ments free of charge, in which case the cost to the customer is equal to the face value of
each instrument .
152 For variations, see text at footnotes .168-174, infra.
"' Bank drafts: see in general, Fart 1, two paragraphs following that containing
footnote 20; certification: see in general, Part 11, paragraph containing footnotes 99-100 .
154 See part 1, text at footnotes 19-22, supra.
155 Credit unions may issue personal money orders. only to members, in which case
they are likely to keep a record copy with .the senders name . In addition, an issuing
branch ofany financial institution may occasionally type the particulars on'the instrument
as instructed by the sender. Such a service, which may produce a filled-in bank. record .
copy, is not inherent in the standard procedure for issuing personal money orders .
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even fill in his own name andcash the instrument . Furthermore, while the
sender is instructed on the sender's record copy to complete the instru-
ment promptly, and is often cautioned there to do so for his own protec-
tion, he may, practically speaking, never fill in a payee's name. Instead,
the sender may deliver the blank (save for the imprinted amount) instru-
ment, either for value or by way of gift, to another, who in turn mayeither
do the same, or fill in a payee's name and use the instrument in payment
of his own debt . 'S6
Inasmuch as it is filled in by the sender, the personal money order
resembles a personal cheque . Nevertheless, unlike the case of the per-
sonal cheque, the amount is . imprinted on the personal money order in
advance. This advance imprinting may be seen as quite similar to cheque
certification. "' Yet, as a matter of form, a personal money order is
distinguishable from a certified cheque . The latter is originally drawn on
the drawer's chequing account. Thus, all particulars, including the amount,
are first written by the drawer. It is only the complete instrument which is
certified . 158 In contrast, a personal money order is not drawn on the
sender's running account. The imprinted amount inserted on the other-
wise blank instrument is not a certification of a prewritten amount . The
word "certification" does not appear on a personal money order.
In fact, the personal money order bears the closest resemblance to
the Canadian postal money order. The latter is sold over the counter by
any post office'59 in a blank form, except for the amount which is imprinted
by the issuing post office with an imprinting machine. The purchaser
(designated on the instrument as "sender") fills in all other particulars,
namely the payee's name and his own name and address. The date of
issuance is imprinted on the instrument together with other information
identifying the particular postal money order. On the copy to be retained
in his records, the sender is warned "for [his] protection", to "Enter
IMMEDIATELY name of payee and sender on Money order" . 16° The
copy kept at the post office records information only as to amount, date
15e Such a practice may raise a few complex legal issues as to rights respecting the
blank instrument. Such questions are outside the scope of this article . But cf. text contain-
ing footnotes 231 and 232, infra .
15' For more on this aspect, see text at footnotes 193-198, infra.
158 See Part II, text and footnote 100, supra.
159 The current authority for the postal money order services stems from section
5(1)(a) of the Canada Post Corporation Act, S.C . 1980-81-82-83, c. 54, allowing the
Corporation :
. . . to establish and operate a postal service for the collection, transmission and
delivery of messages, information, funds and goods . . .
Canadian postal money orders were first issued in 1855 by the Province of Canada
(information provided to me by R. Pouliotte, Manager of Money Order Services, in a
letter dated September 24, 1984).
1eo Capital letters in the original .
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andplace of issue, and serial number of the particular postal money order.
No information is recorded as to the sender's (not to mention the payee's)
identity. . .
Unlike the typical personal money order, the postal money order is
payable to a payee and not his order. Furthermore, the sender of a postal
money order is required neither to sign nor to fill in a.date . These charac
teristics should not be taken to impede the negotiability of the postal
money order as a bill of exchange . To begin with, having written his
name, the sender must be taken-to,authenticate his payment order, namely
to "sign" the instrument : 161 Secondly, as for the absence of a written
date, neither a bill nor, a note requires a "date" as a constitutive element
of the respective definition . 162 In any event, the date- of the purchase
(though not of use or payment to a payee) is imprinted on .the instrument .
Thirdly, so far: as negotiability is concerned, the fact that a postal money
order is not expressed to be., payable to the payee's order is immaterial .
Under section 22(1), an instrument" payable to ordermay be "expressed
to be payable.-to a particular person" and need not specifically recite the
word "order" . 164 Objections, to the negotiability of the postal money
order, existing in-the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere, 165
are based on particular statutory provisions, as well as on the form of the
instrument . They do, not apply to the Canadian postal money order. Not
being drawn on a bank, the latter is not a "cheque'.' . 166 Nevertheless,
ïna-smuch as it is an "order", the instrument appears to be a bill . 167
There are some variations of the standard personal money order
form. One bank calls .the instrument a "money order', apparently to
161 Cf. Part 1, text and footnote-43, supra: Atyped name was held -to satisfy statutory
"signature" requirements inRe Botiuk and Collison, supra, footnote 42,,at pp . 360-361.
See also Benedict v. Lebowitz, 3,46 F, 2d 120 (2nd Cir., 1965).
162 Cf. s . 27 : - -
A bill is not invalid by reason only that it (a) is not dated : . .
163 The provision speaks of a "bill" only . Nevertheless, under s. 186(1), the general
rule is that provisions relating to bills, "apply, with the necessary modifications, to
promissory notes'".
164 This is id contrast to the position under the American U.C.C .,, where an instru-
ment expressed to be payable to a particular person is not an instrument payable to order;
see s. 3-110.
165 U.S . : for a comprehensive discussion, see J.D . O'Malley; Legal Aspects of
Postal Money Orders (1967), 52 Corn . L.Q . 357, at pp ., 358-362; U.K.:-Fine Art Society
v. Union Bank ofLondon (1886), 17 Q.B .D . 705, at pp.,710, 712-713 (C.A.) . See also
Byles, op . cit., footnote 48, p. 326; Chalmers,-op, çit_ footnote 35, p. 354; Paget, op .
cit., footnote 65, p. 220; South Africa: Cowenand Gering, op . cit., footnote 6, p. 279.
166 As defined in s. 165(1) of the Act, reproduced in footnote 9, supra.
167 As defined in s. 17(1). The position of Canada Post Corporation, as conveyed to
me by Daniel Paul, Counsel, in aletter dated December 7, 1984, is that "[tlhe Canadian
postal money order is classified as a negotiable instrument" .
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emphasize two points . The first is that not only individuals, but also
corporations, partnerships and other artificial entities may purchase and
use the instrument . The second point is that those who sign on behalf of
such bodies do not incur thereby "personal" liability . These points are
well taken; nevertheless, the terminology selected is quite unfortunate.
The "money order" is typically an instrument signed by authorized offi-
cers of the bank."' The term "personal money order" was originally
coined so as to distinguish such an instrument from the bank moneyorder.
Characterizing an instrument not bearing an authorized signature on behalf
of the bank as a "money order" is thus quite confusing."'
Another bank inserts on the personal money order a facsimile signa-
ture of its authorized signing officer. Apparently, the purpose is to avoid
altogether the controversy and confusion as to the issuing bank's liability
on the instrument . "° The sender himself is not required to sign such an
instrument . There are blanks required to be filled in by himas to his name
and address. But there is no signature line . "' In effect, this modified
"personal moneyorder" is not a personal money order in the usual sense.
Inasmuch as it bears the signature of an authorized officer on behalf of the
bank, it is a species of the bank money order, or a bank draft."Z
Credit unions in Ontario sell personal money orders bearing the
printed name of the Ontario central rather than the name of the individual
credit union member. The issuer may imprint its name or initials on the
instrument side by side with the amount . The reference to the central
rather than to the individual member reflects the fact that the instrument is
drawn on an account which the credit union member has at the central. In
fact, personal money orders issued by all financial institutions may be
drawn on an account of the issuing branch at a central department of the
issuing bank. Nevertheless, individual member credit unions are distinct
entities, separate from their central . Consequently, it is only in their case
that the identity of the central body is reflected on the instrument itself. 173
yes See Part 1, text and footnote 34 and thereafter, supra.
`9 Unfortunately, this confusion is also shared by the courts . See, e.g ., Emerick v.
Long Island Trust Co ., 20 U.C.C . Rep. 424 (N.Y Sujj . Ct. App. T., 1976), where
"personal money order" and "bank money order" are used interchangeably. From the
report, it appears that the case was actually concerned with the former.
For a detailed discussion, see text at footnotes 187-237, infra.
Occasionally, the sender may nevertheless sign on the line over which he is
instructed to write his name . Quaere as to the legal implication of such a signature . As to
the sender's written or typed name as signature, see text and footnote 161, supra.
172 See text at footnote 34, supra. For a facsimile signature as "signature", see Part
1, text and footnotes 35-48, supra.
173 In fact, there is no statutory requirement to put the central's name on the instru-
ment. The personal money order may be drawn on the issuing credit union, as credit
union's drafts are. See Part 1, text and footnote 23, supra.
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Some personal money orders do not require the sender to sign . He is
only required to fill in his name and address . No signature line is provided
in the form. Such an instrument has- no signature, line whatsoever, and
compared to other forms of personal money orders, is even closer in its
form to the postal money order.Having filled in . his name, the sender
must be taken to "sign it . 175 - .
s a rule, personal, as well as postal money orders, are issued only
for relatively small sums of money. Ceilings are typically printed on the
instrument itself . Currently, ceilings used by various financial institutions
seem to range from $250 to $1,000 . 176 Postal money orders may not
exceed $200. 1' Nevertheless, where ' a larger payment is required, a
sender may, acquire several instruments, in the total amount of his debt,
and use them in payment to his creditor of the entire debt . 178
Personal money orders originated in the United States in the late
thirties . They proliferated during the postwar era as instruments designed
"for .persons who cannot afford or have little need to maintain checking
accounts" ; "[t]hey are in greatest use primarily among the poor, but are
also employed by housewives, minors and other persons whose noncash
transactions are too few to warrant the upkeep of a chequing account" .' 179
Their attraction, including in particular the reason for their post war
increased use, has been described as follows:
Personal money orders . . . have grown steadily in popularity since 1944,
when the, price of the competing. Post Office Money Order was raised . Personal
money orders are attractive to people who, have no ordinary checking accounts, for
they offer a safe, inexpensive, and readily acceptable means of transferring funds,
in a form that has the prestigious appearance of a personal check. Moreover, banks
favor the instruments because they are simpler, faster, and less expensive to issue
than cashier's checks and bank money orders ; because they attractpotential custom-
ers for other bank services ; and because they can create a substantial deposit balance
for the bank's use. i s°
174 The remaining principal differences : such a personal money order is expressed to
be payable to order and contains a blank for a date .
175 See text and footnote 161, supra:
176, This is my general impression from instruments seen by me, as . well as from
discussions with bankers. I did not contact all Canadian financial institutions . Nor did I
physically examine all forms of personal money order currently issued in Canada. ,
177 The back of the instrument bears the following legend : "Instructions to Cashing
Agent [-] DO NOTCASH; . . . if the amount exceeds: $200.00. . . ." .
ins See, e.g .,, Graybar Electric Co . Inc. v. Brookline Trust Co ., 39 U.C.C . Rep.
1721, 1722 (Mass. Mun. Ct. App. Div., 1984), where the sender used 5 personal,money
orders, each in the sum of $500, to pay a $2,500 debt .
179 Comment, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the
U.C.C . (1967), 67 Colum. L. Rev. 524, at p. 524,,text and n. 2.
186 Ibid ., at pp. 525-526.
136
181 H.J . Bailey, Bank Personal Money Orders as Bank Obligations (1964), 81 Bank-
ing L.J . 669, at p. 671 .
"z See Rose Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. Chemical BankNew York TrustCo ., 252
N.YS. 2d 100 (N.YS.C . App. T., 1964), aff'ng 244 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (City Civ. Ct. Trial
T., 1963); Sequoyah State Bank v. Union National Bank ofLittle Rock, 621 S .W. 2d 683
(Ark . S.C., 1981).
183 In doing so, a debtor may have diverse motives. First, where his account is
already overdrawn, he may prefer to take a course which will not allow the bank to apply
the funds towards the satisfaction of the debtor's debt to the bank . Secondly, tax reasons,
fiduciary capacity, or bookkeeping considerations may all weigh against mixing the
earmarked funds in the general account.
184 But cf. footnote 155, supra.
185 As were the facts in Goberdhan v. Banque Canadienne Nationale, [1978] C.P.
340.
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Because of their use by the poor without checking accounts they
were often regarded as providing a "poor man's checking account" . '81
Nevertheless, a few American cases indicate that a personal money order
may be paid for by the sender's cheque . 18' Hence, the instrument is used
also by customers having chequing accounts . It seems that the current
widespread use of personal money orders is largely attributed to the
common belief, discussed below, that they represent a method of guaran-
teed payment. On his part, a debtor using earmarked funds to pay a debt
may prefer to buy with those funds a personal money order and make it
payable to the creditor, rather than deposit the funds in his general chequing
account and withdraw them therefrom by cheque payable to the creditor. 183
Finally, compared to other payment instruments, except for the postal
money order, the personal money order reflects a more discrete payment
machinery. Upon a purchase of the personal money order, the sender is
not required to disclose his name or give any identifying information. "'
No statement or cancelled instrument is sent to his address subsequent to
collection . He may purchase as well as sign the instrument using a
pseudonym, 185 or even transfer it in a blank form to his creditor. 116Never-
theless, confidentiality is not absolute . It does not apply to the holder
presenting the instrument for payment. For its own protection, the col-
lecting bank is likely to require the holder to identify himself to its
satisfaction .
Judicial opinion varies as to the juridical nature of the personal
money order and the existence, nature and scope of the issuing bank's
liability . In Quebec, Goberdhan v. Banque Canadienne Nationalel87 held
that the sender's countermand of payment may not determine the issuing
bank's duty and authority to pay a personal money order pursuant to
section 167(a) of the Act .'88 The instrument was treated as embodying a
186 See text and footnote 156, supra.
187 Supra, footnote 185.
188 Under s. 167, "[t]he duty and authority of a bank to pay a cheque drawn on it by
its customer, are determined by (a) countermand of payment . . ." .
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primary obligation on the part ofthe issuing batik. As to the nature.of that
instrument and the bank's resulting liability thereon, .the court stated .that
"this [personal] money order issued in blank is simply a note payable to
bearef, in the same way as a Bank, note issued by the Bank of Canada" . 189
Perhaps this ,vas A-mere characterization of the function of the personal
money order. as paper money; rather than judicial determination as to the
jurisprudential nature of the instrument . Indeed, the court went on to'
say.i9o'
Thejuridical nature of this personal money order places it in the same category as a
cheque . ., . In this ,case . . . Bank is drawee . This is like a certified cheque because
the Bank in inserting the amount in the instrument by its protectograph, machine
undertakes topay any holder who presents this for payment,the amountIndicated on
its face .
Specifically indicating that, as in the case of the certified -cheque, "the
money is held in reserve to pay the obligation assumedby the Bank", the
court concluded that "the Bank as acceptor cannot refuse to
pay
a holder
of the. . . . [personal] moneyorder", 19t
Hence, the personal money order was classified as a cheque, the
imprinting_ of the amount was treated as -certification, and the bank's
liability on the instrument was regarded as acceptance .
American jurisprudence is substantially richer, though more equivo-
cal. In the final analysis, the pendulum currently swings in the opposite
direction, namely towards viewing the personal money order as à per
sonal cheque ; on which payment can be countermanded; and not as- a
guaranteed payment machinery. The prevailing view as to the personal
money order is that the drawee bank is not liable to the holder.
The leading authority is Garden Check Cashing . Service.Inc . v. First
National City Bank. 192 A personal money order, in the usual blank form
save for the imprinted amount, was lost by the sender. A finder signed it, .
completed it in his own favour, and cashed it with the plaintiff, a licensed
cashing service. Purporting to comply with the sender's stop payment
order, given after . the less of the instrument,, . the_ defendant issuing bank
189 Supra, footnote 185., at p. 341 .
190 Ibid . (Emphasis added) .
19, Ibid . In drawing the analogy, the court purported to follow Perrault, op . cit.,
footnote 134, pp . 1035-1039, nos . 772-774. Nevertheless, it seems that Perrault speaks
only of certified cheques and not ofpersonal money orders . Moreover, the court's termi
nology lacked precision. Thus, the court spoke of the holder of the "note" or "money
order" . Nevertheless, the overall context is quite clear in indicating that the court was
concerned with the personal money order.
192 3 U.C.C . Rep. 355 (N.Y Sup. Ct . App. Div., 1966), affd . mem. 4U.C.C . Rep.
322 (N.Y C.A ., 1966). The trial court had held for the defendant: 238 N.Y.S . 2d 751
(City Civ. Ct ., 1963), and the Appellate term had reversed : 260 N.Y.S . 2d 718 (N.YS.C .
App. T., 1965). ,
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refused payment to the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser for valuè of the
personal money order.
Initial judicial inconclusiveness was ultimately brought to an end by
the New York Appellate Division . Dismissing the plaintiff's action, the
court reasoned that the personal money order was a species of uncertified
personal cheque, on which the drawee bank was not liable to the holder.
Elaborating on this characterization, the court explained as follows:"'
We see small difference between the present transaction [the purchase of a personal
money order] and one where a person deposits with a bank a sum of money and
receives a quantity of blank checks . The obvious difference is that here a single
deposit was made and a single blank check received with the amount ofthe deposit
inserted therein . Thereafterthe procedure followed the normal andcustomary pattern-
the purchaser filled in the name of a payee, signed his name and address and
delivered the instrument . . .
Hence, the sender could lawfully countermand payment. Notbeing liable
to the plaintiff-holder on the instrument, the defendant drawee bank was
obliged to comply with the stop payment order, refuse payment, and
refund the sender.
In Garden, the sender's right to stop payment was premised on
treating the personal money order as a species of uncertified personal
cheque on which the drawee bank, which had not signed it, was not
liable . 194 On this basis, the sender was allowed to stop payment in cases
involving the theft of a personal money order. 195 Garden was also fol-
lowed in situations where a sender, who paid with a personal money
order, countermanded payment so as to subvert payment to his creditor.
The claim of the creditor-holder against the issuing bank was dismissed,
on the theory that the issuing bank was adrawee which had not signed the
instrument . 196
193 3 U.C.C . Rep. 355, at p. 358 (Emphasis added) .
'94 See also Lupowitz v. New York Bankfor Savings, 5 U.C.C . Rep. 851 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct ., 1968); Melco Products Corp . v. Public Relations Enterprises Inc., 35 U.C.C . Rep.
1600 (N.Y Sup. Ct . Special T., 1983). The former explicitly followed Garden. The latter .
report reproduces only the head note. Garden was also cited with approval in State v.
LaRue, 487 P 2d 255 (Wash. App., 1971). For treating the issuer of a personal money
order as a drawee of a cheque, see also Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. American Express Co.,
35 U.C.C . Rep. 558, at pp . 560-561 (N.Y Co . Civ. Ct ., 1982).
195 Thompson v. Lake County National Bank, 20 U.C.C . Rep. 142 (Ohio App.,
1975); American Bank & Trust Co . ofPennsylvania v. Commonwealth National Bank, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 425 (Pa. C.P, 1976). The former explicitly followed Garden . Its fact
situation involved also forgery ofpayee's endorsement and was thus distinguishable from
Garden .
196 Newman v. First National State Bank of Toms RiverN.J ., 29 U.C.C . Rep. 182
(N.J . Superior App. Div., 1980); Berler v. Barclays Bank ofNew York, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
210 (N.Y Sup. Ct . App. Div., 1981); Krom v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 10
U.C.C . Rep. 837 (N.Y Sup. Ct . App. Div., 1972); United Apparel Distributors, Inc. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A ., 35 U.C.C . Rep. 577 (U.S . DC SD NY, 1982). The reports
in the latter two cases do not reveal whether a genuine sender-payee dispute was involved.
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Two reported cases falling into the, latter category involve straight-
forward fraud of. the sender on the creditor.T One case explicitly held
that an acceptance of an instrument, must contain the signature of the
drawee . "The mere fact that the printed name of the Bank . appeared on
the face of the [personal] moneyorder was not. sufficient to constitutie.its
signature and therefore was not . an acceptance of the instrument . . . " .
Consequently, [the sender] had the right to stop payment. 77198 . . .
It was also held that the. personal money order "did not of. itself
operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the [drawee bank]
available for its payment" . 199 Nor did the issue of the personal money
order constitute a representation of the issuing bank to the holder as to
availability of funds to meet the instrument when presented. Such an
argument . "presupposes the bank has actually issued the [personal] money
order",200 while in fact it only imprinted the amount thereon.
Several American cases reached the opposite conclusion . The land-
mark case is .Rose Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New
York TrustCo.2ot- There, aNew York court explicitly rejected_the classifi
cation of the personal money order as "a check drawn on a_ .regular or
special . . . . account, where continuity is a factor and an- account desig-
nated to the depositor is opened . . ." . While acknowledging differences
"in detail", it held that the personal money order "is akin to a cashier's
check or a traveler's check drawnby the issuing bank upon itself" .202 As
a species of abank draw°3 the instrument carries with it the liability ofthe
issuing bank. The court characterized the purchase of the personal money
order by the sender as a purchase of the bank's credit and concluded that
"in legal effect", as a vehicle for transmitting that credit, the instrument
was "the same as a certificate of deposit or certified check .204As -foithe
signature requirement, the court opined :that "the printed name of the
'97 Newman v. First National State Bank of Toms RiverN.J., ibid. ;- Berler v. Bar-
claysBank ofNew York, ibid.
'98 Newman, ibid., at pp . 186-187.
199 Ibid ., at p. 187.
s°° American Bank & Trust Co . ofPennsylvania v. Commonwealth . National Bank,
supra, footnote 195, at p. 427 . The criticism reflects a formalistic (or strictly legal)
definition of "issue". Compare footnote 10, supra.
20 ' Supra, footnote 182. Perhaps there were two earlier cases: Cross v. Exchange
Bank Co., 168 N.E . 2d 910 (Ohio App., 1958); and First State Bank ofBooker v. First
National Bank ofBeaver, 319F 2d 338 (10th Cir., 1963) . It is nonetheless far from certain
whether these cases actually dealt with personal (as opposed to bank) money orders : Nor
did both courts explicitly dealwith the nature ofthe instrument and thebanker's obligation
thereon. See Bailey, loc. cit., footnote 181,'at pp . 672-675. .
202 Supra, footnote 182, at p. 102 (252N.YS2d)..
203 Under the Canadian terminology. See Part 1, text at . footnote 34, supra.
204 Supra; -footnote 182, at p. 103 (252 N.Y.S . 2d).
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bank verified by its seal impressed at the time of the sale [of the instru-
ment to the sender] is sufficient to evidence the bank's intent to be bound
thereunder" .2os The impression of the amount on an instrument bearing
the bank's printed name was thus regarded as tantamount to the authenti-
cating of the writing as an obligation on behalf of the bank .206
Rose was followed by the majority of the court in the Arkansas
decision, Sequoyah State Bank v. UnionNational Bank ofLittle Rock.207
Along similar lines, Interfirst Bank Carrollton v. Northpark National
Bank ofDallas208 was of the opinion that "the personal money order is
analogous to a bank money order", (in Canadian terminology the bank
draft) . Conceding "lack of signature" on the personal money order, the
court did not find this fact to be "controlling", "for the bank elected to
sell the money order in the form which it did, and it selected in lieu of a
signature the checkwriting imprint of [its name and amount]" .209 This
indeed is quite close to the Quebec certification theory.2l° Another judg-
ment raised the possibility of viewing the sender's signature as binding
the issuing bank.211 Issuing the blank personal money order, save for the
amount, amounted to an authority given by the bank to the sender to bind
the issuing bank for that amount by signing and delivering the intrument
to the holder.
Other courts fastened liability upon the issuing bank on the basis of
estoppel or representation . Estoppel could be linked to negligence, either
in issuing blank instruments (save for the amount), or in failing to obtain
cash payment from the sender purchasing the instrument . The liability of
the issuing bank to a good faith purchaser for value of an instrument lost
by its sender in a blank form was accordingly rationalized on the basis
that the bank "knowingly and deliberately issues and delivers its personal
money orders to purchasers with the name of the payee and purchaser in
blank" .212 Similarly, an issuing bank's defence based on the failure of
205 Ibid., U.C.C . s . 3-401(1) provides : "No person is liable on an instrument unless
his signature appears thereon." The provision corresponds to s. 131 of the Canadian Act,
reproduced in its relevant part in the text which follows footnote 57, supra.
206 Compare with the discussion on "signature" respecting cheque certification, Part
11, text at footnotes 132-134, supra.
2°7 Supra, footnote 182. See also footnote 212, infra.
208 38 U.C.C . Rep. 1684, at p. 1687 (Tex . C.A ., 1984).
209 Ibid ., at p. 1687 .
21° See text at footnotes 187-191, supra. For the practice of imprinting the bank's
name, see also text at footnote 173, supra.
211 Mirabile v. Udoh, 399MYS. 2d 869, at pp. 870, 871 (City Civ. Ct., 1977).
212 Garden Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 258N.Y.S . 2d
918, at p. 922 (City Civ. Ct ., 1965). This was a different case from, but involved the same
type offact pattern, as the Garden case discussed in the text commencing at footnote 192.
The instant Garden case cited Rose Check Cashing Service, supra, footnote 182, with
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consideration between itself and the sender was successfully met by an
argument based on the bank's ownnegligence ; "the . . . bank here failed
to observe the proper caution in issuing the money orders . . . and it,
rather than the .- . . holder, must bear the loss arising from the -fraud
perpetrated by the original purchaser" .213
Estoppel could also be made out on the basis of representation .
Explicitly citing'estoppel, one court remarked:thât "[t]he [issuing] bank
has catere& to the belief among merchants that [personal] money, orders
carry different connotations from checks"' .2" Likewise, another court
rested its decision on the basis 'of the reasonable expectations of those
involved in a personal -money order transaction-
. . .
-
by issuing each money order in blank, except for the'amount, in exchange for
cash, the Bank impliedly represented that it would honor-that is, that it intended to
accept-each draft when and if duly presented. Its liability [to the holder] thus is
founded not on the instruments themselves, but upon itsfailure to honor the duly
presented items in accordance with this implied representation .215
The issuing bank's liability to the holder was thus derived neither from
statutory engagement on the instrument nor from an express representa-
tion or any other explicit contract outside the. instrument . The representa-
tion was, rather, "implied from the circumstances" or. "from the facts
[of] the . . . case" . 21 .
It is .thus evident. that two views exist in relation to the issuing bank's
liability to the holder on a personal money order. Garden Check Cashing
Service and cases which followed it held against the existence of liability.
Rose Check Cashing Service, Sequoyah State Bank and others found the
bank . to be liable under' one theory or another. Indeed, observing the
existence of two lines of cases "construing personal money orders", one
court believed that the division is "between the New York holdings and
the Arkansas holdings' . 217 . Nevertheless, New York case law is not con-
Ibid., at p.-1724 .
approval . It expressly disagreed with the trial court in the . other Garden. case, but was
decided before the appellate decisions in that case .
213 Emerick v. Long Island Trust Co ., 20 U.C.C . Rep. 424, at p. 425 (N.YS.C . App.
T., 1976). For more details on this class of cases, see text around footnote 220, infra.
214 Mirabile v. Udoh, supra, footnote 211, at p. 871. But cf. v. Countryman, A.L .
Kaufman andZ.B . Wiseman, Commercial Law(2nd ed., 1982), p. 427, where the "very
clear" opinion of the Bank Management Commission of the American Bankers Associa-
tion as stated in 1956 "[beefore there was any case law on the subject" is quoted to be that
the personal money order, unlike the bank money order, "is considered in the same status
as a personal check . . . of the signer". Banks are nevertheless cautioned not to create
contrary expectations in advertising the service; ibid .
215 . Graybar Electric Co . Inc. v. Brookline Trust Co., 39 U.C.C . Rep. 1721, at p.
1725 (Mass. Mun. Ct . App. Div., 1984) . (Emphasis added) .
217 Interfirst BankCarrollton v. NorthparkNationalBank ofDallas, supra, footnote
208, at p. 1686.
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sistent in relieving the issuing bank from liability." $ Furthermore, Sequoyah
State Bank2I9 which is the leading Arkansas decision, explicitly followed
Rose Check Cashing Service, a New York judgment . The dividing line
between those charging the issuing bank with liability, and those relieving
it, is..thus not geographical .
A majority of cases holding against the issuing bank were concerned
with the bank attempting to escape liability on the basis of its own
defences against the sender (purchaser of the personal money order) .
Those defences were based on the failure of consideration for which the
personal money order was sold to the sender."0 Such was the case where
the personal money order was paid for by the sender with a cheque drawn
on insufficient funds, a forged cheque, or a withdrawal from an over-
drawn account.221
Attempts have been made to reconcile cases rejecting these defences
with Garden CheckCashing Service. For example, the majority in Sequoyah
State Bank222 defined the issue in terms of whether the issuing bank can
"by its own initiative . . . stop payment on a personal money order it had
issued in exchange for a hot check", and regarded it as distinguishable
from the question discussed in Garden Check Cashing Service, namely
whether the sender himself may stop payment. Nevertheless, in the final
analysis, such a distinction is neither correct nor feasable . To begin with,
it does not take into account the fact that the issuing bank has also been
held liable in circumstances not involving its own defences . Indeed, one
case finding against the bank was concerned with a fact situation similar
to that in Garden Check Cashing Service.223 Another decision effectively
prevented the sender from frustrating payment to the payee, to whom he
hadpaid with the instrument, by not allowing him to countermand payment.'
Secondly, the Appellate Division in Garden Check Cashing Service225
viewed itself as called upon to choose between the "diverse results"
218 See, e.g., Mirabile v. Udoh, supra, footnote 211.
219 Supra, footnote 182, at p. 684.
220 It seems that all cases dealing with this fact situation held against the bank . But
cf. text at footnotes 222-227, infra.
221 Insufficient funds: Rose Check Cashing Service, supra, footnote 182; Sequoyah
State Bank, ibid. ; forged cheque :InterfirstBank Carrollton, supra, footnote 208;Emerick,
supra, footnote 213; Graybar Electric Co . Inc., supra footnote 215.
222 Supra, footnote 182, at p. 683. See also Emerick, supra, footnote 213.
223 See text around footnote 212, supra.
224 Mirabile v. Udoh, supra, footnote 211. Garden Check Cashing Service was
sought to be distinguished as a case concerned with a person who cashes an instrument to
which he has no title (see text in paragraph containing footnote 192, supra) and so was
unauthorized to bind the bank; ibid., at p. 870. Cf. text at footnote 211, supra. An
opposite result was reached in cases cited in footnote 196, supra.
225 Supra, footnote 192, at p. 356 (3 U.C.C . Rep.) .
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reached by the trial court in that case and Rose Check-Cashing Service.
y reinstating the trial - , court's judgment, it thus purported, to overrule
Rose. A few subsequent cases226 expressly regarded the final Garden
judgments as overruling Rose. Hence, it is inaccurate to present existing
legal doctrine as purporting to accommodate both Garden andRose.
Last but not least, as a matter of legal analysis, both lines of cases,
Garden and Rose, are. irreconcilable . An explanation for the inability . of
the issuing bank to raise defences . against the holder presupposes that, in
the absence of those defences, the bank is liable . But this assumption
goes directly against Garden which held against the existence of this
liability . Stated otherwise, the question of the bank's defences against the
holder, or its ability "by its own initiative [to] stop payment on.,4 personal
money order",` does not arise at all unless it is assumed ab initio that
the bank is liable in the first place, the very point rejected by Garden.
Personal money orders are easily cashable by Canadian financial
institutions . It seems that they are generally accepted by creditors as a
good substitute for cash . In the final analysis, the personal money order
should be treated as a banker's engagement . Indeed, as a matter .of statu-
toty interpretation, Garden could allow the sender to countermand pay-
ment only because the right to stop payment is given by statute to the
"customer" and not to the "drawer" .228 Nevertheless, inasmuch as the
sale of the personal money order is the equivalent of providing acustomer
with a single blank cheque bearing the amount of a single deposit, as
suggested in Garden, the issuing bank is bound to pay only by complying
with the, "customer's" order. 229 Stated otherwise; had the bank paid in
Garden, even in the absence of a stop .payment order, it would have been
subject to the customer's action tb recover the amount of payment, as if it
were a drawee bank which had paid a cheque bearing an unauthorized or
forged signature~of its customer. But unlike the running chequing account
situation, the bank issuing a personal money order has neither a signature
card, nor necessarily an ongoing relationship with the sender-customer, to
protect itself. It is at this point that the personal cheque analogy breaks
226 Lupowitz v. New York Bank for Savings, supra, footnote 194; State v. La Rue,
ibid ., At p. 258.
227 Sequoyah StateBank v. UnionNationalBankofLittle Rock, supra, footnote 182,
at p. 683. See text and footnote 222, supra.
228 U.C.C . s . 4-403(1) ; see also s: 167(a) of the Canadian Act to the same effect .
Quaere whether stop payment order should have been given to the branch which issued
the 'instrument, or to the department on which it is drawn: For the possibility that both
departments maynot be identical and even form two separate institutions, see, e.g ., text at
footnote 173, supra. The general point was specifically discussed in Newman v. .First
National State Bank ofToms RiverN.J ., supra, footnote 196, at p. 187. -
229 See in general, B . Geva, Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange
ActSome Doctrinal Aspects (1981-82), 6 Can. Bus. L.J . 269, at p. 302.
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down .23o Thepersonal money order cannot be made mechanically subject
to a wholesale application of rules concerning uncertified cheques.
Commercial expediency requires that by taking a blank instrument,
save for the amount imprinted by the bank, the sender incurs all risks
involved due to his failure to fill in promptly all blanks . 231 The blank
(save for the amount) personal money order should be treated as a bearer
instrument, on the same footing as an instrument endorsed in blank is so
considered . 232 Notwithstanding Garden, a bona fide purchaser for value
should prevail over the sender. By the same token, assuming no forged
endorsements are involved, payment in good faith to the holder should
discharge the bank.
In general, the use of payment instruments as substitutes for cash
should be equated as far as possible with payment in specie . It must be
remembered that in connection with payment by cheque, the right to
countermand payment, as well as the creditor's indefinite lack of assur-
ance as to sufficiency of funds, are merely incidents of the imperfection
of the cheque system where no funds are irrevocably set aside by the
drawee prior to actual payment. This is not the case in the personal money
order situation . Cheque analogies should therefore not be pursued with
the utmost zeal .
At the same time, Rose233 is oversimplistic and technically errone-
ous. Bearing neither a handwritten nor a facsimile signature of an author-
ized bank officer, the personal money order cannot be viewed as a species
of bank draft.234 It is more consistent with legal doctrine to treat the
personal money order as a certified cheque . 235 In Canada, section 37(1)(a)
allows for the acceptance of a bill "before it has been signed by the
drawer, or while otherwise incomplete" . The impression of the amount
by the bank can be seen as certifying the amount as well as authenticating
the writing, namely "signing" it .236 Indeed, as a concept rather than as a
mere description of the current practice, "certification" can be viewed as
sufficiently broad to accommodate the relatively new practice of imprint-
ing the amount on apersonal moneyorder to be issued, so as to "certify"
230 Cf. Bailey, loc. cit., footnote 181, at pp . 676-677 . His proposed solution is
nonetheless to fasten liability on the bank "apart from the instrument", a view which was
subsequently echoed in cases discussed in the text at footnotes 211-216, supra.
231 Perhaps some kind of an insurance scheme should compensate senders against
robberies occurring on the issuing bank's premises .
232 Compare the text at footnote 189, supra; and see ss . 21(3) and 67(2) of the Act.
233 See text and footnotes 201-206.
234 Compare Part 1, text at footnotes 19-20, 3448, supra.
235 Compare with text at footnotes 187-191, supra (Goberdhan) .
236 Compare Part 11, text and footnotes 123-134, supra.
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to the holder thd availability of sufficient funds .237 By certifying the
"cheque" the issuing bank incurs acceptor's liability to the holder.238,
Upon :signing the personal money order, the sender becomes liable
thereon 4g'its drawer. Where he merely fills in his particulars, he must be
taken to "sign" the instrument as well .239. It is only in this Way that the
personal, as well as the postal24° money order, can be made to fit into a
recognized category under the Act.
Conclusion
Banker's instruments can broadly be described as payment instruments
governed by the Bills of Exchange Act payable on demand, on which a
bank or another financial institution is liable to the holder. They are
mechanisms for the transmission of funds between individual as well as
corporate debtors and creditors, which facilitate the avoidance of the risk
of physical carriage ofmoney as well as giving the creditor. the assurance
of payment in the form of the banker's credit attached to them-.
Bank drafts, including bank money orders, certified cheques, and
personal money orders, are banker's instruments. . Bank drafts are bills of
exchange as well as cheques. The issuing bank's liability thereon is that
of adrawer. Where the bank draft is drawn on the drawer, the holder may
treat the instrument as a promissory note on which the issuing bank is
liable as a maker. Bank drafts drawn on the drawer are often viewed as
accepted bills of exchange on which the issuing bank is liable as an
acceptor.
The binding - effect of cheque certification is well established. The
precise legal impact of certification is nevertheless quite controversial .
The better view is to treat the certification of the cheque as an acceptance .
The juridical nature of the personal money order has not been set-
tled . Likewise, the question of the issuing bank's liability on that instru-
ment has not been conclusively determined . The better view is to treat the
personal money order as a banker's instrument on which the issuing bank
is liable . The instrument ought to be treated as a certified cheque on
237 Notwithstanding text in paragraph containing footnotes 157, 158, supra. Credit
unions should be taken to certify on behalf of the central on which the instrument is
drawn; cf. text at footnote 173, supra. For the description of the current practice, see Part
II, text at footnotes 97-101 ; supra.
238 For the statutory contract of the acceptor, see Part I, paragraph containing notes
79-82, supra. For certification as an acceptance, see Part 11, supra.
239 See text at footnote 174, supra; text and footnotes 161, 175, supra.
24° See text at footnotes 159, 160, supra. Needless to say, the postal money order is
not a cheque ; ibid. Hence, it must be viewed as an accepted bill .
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which the issuing bank is liable as an acceptor. By the same token, a
postal money order is to be treated as an accepted bill of exchange .
The banker's obligation on the bank draft, certified cheque, or per-
sonal money order is binding towards the holder. As such it is irrevoca-
ble. Whether it is also absolute and autonomous, namely free from the
bank's defences against the customer, as well as from defences of the
customer against his creditor, is an entirely different matter, outside the
scope of this article.
